

Developing Intelligence Capabilities in Support of UN Peace Operations

An Institutional Approach

Jacob Aasland Ravndal



Master's Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies

Department of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

May 20, 2009

Acknowledgements

Thank you first of all to my thesis supervisor, Anders Kjølberg, for having faith in this project from the very beginning, and for accommodating me at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).

Thank you also to my FFI colleagues from the project Challenges in Peacebuilding and Stabilisation (CHIPS) for rewarding feedback sessions and sharing of expertise. Special thanks go to Stian Kjeksrud for facilitating the field trip and to Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen for excellent guidance and feedback.

Thank you to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) for scholarship support, and for providing me with an inspiring working environment at the Department of Security and Conflict Management (ASK).

Thank you also to fellow student Andreas Stensland, for rendering helpful comments and advice during our numerous feedback sessions.

Finally, thank you to all the informants that participated in interviews and conversations. Without your willingness to cooperate and share information this project would have never been realized.

Jacob Aasland Ravndal

Oslo, May 15, 2009

Acronyms

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
A-team	Assessment Team
DFS	Department of Field Service
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSS	Department of Security and Safety
EISAS	ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I&R Unit	Information and Research Unit
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
MIAS	Military Information Analysis Service
MIB	Military Information Branch
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NGO	Non Governmental Organizations
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Offices
ORCI	Office for Research and the Collection of Information
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
PKI	Peacekeeping Intelligence
R&L Unit	Research and Liaison Unit
SHIRBRIG	Multi-national Standby Force High Readiness Brigade
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SMC	Strategic Military Cell
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force

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1. Introduction

There is a Wild West atmosphere that screams for intelligence. However, whoever's in power wants to keep the UN from achieving intelligence capabilities or using intelligence as part of their missions.

UN official I

Intelligence is a murky and exclusive commodity. It is also a prerequisite for effective performance in complex peace operations (United Nations 2006a:§5). Today, the UN is by far the most active and legitimate ‘peace operator’ in the current international system. Still, the organization has received much criticism for not being able to generate the means necessary to effectively carry out its missions, intelligence support being one of them (Jong et al. 2003, Carment and Rudner 2006). Nearly all previous attempts of developing dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations have either been voted down or disbanded. Accordingly, some scholars have diagnosed the organization with an incurable allergy towards intelligence (Aldrich 2003).

Yet, there are indications of a recent change in attitude towards ‘peacekeeping intelligence’ (PKI). Several intelligence-related concepts and bodies are currently being developed within the UN system. Keeping in mind the previous failed efforts, some would argue that we are now witnessing a *critical juncture* in the path towards developing permanent and dedicated intelligence capabilities in the UN.¹ Others would argue that these entities are doomed to fail, given the distinctive institutional features of the UN. In order to offer a qualified judgment on this conundrum, this study addresses the following research question: *What are the key factors determining development of permanent and dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations?*²

¹ ‘Critical junctures’ are “moments when substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a ‘branching point’ from which the historical development moves onto a new path” (Hall and Taylor 1996:941). See also Collier and Collier (1991), Pierson (2004), and Weingast (2007).

² Dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations is in this study defined as any UN entity whose main purpose and function is to generate information relevant to security-related UN mission mandates through the direction, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of information, both overt and covert, about past, present and future events, and the protection of that final product and its sources from other competing actors.

To answer this question, this study draws on insights offered by the literature on *new institutional theory*, which underscores the relevance of political institutions as independent factors, important to the ordering and understanding of collective life (March and Olsen 1984). The ambition is to explain prospects for *institutional development*, in this case, the development of permanent and dedicated intelligence capabilities within the UN system.³ To that end, a fusion of two specific approaches to new institutional theory – rationalist and historical institutionalism – offers a fruitful theoretical foundation for systematically explaining how a specified policy process unfolds over time.

1.1 Why study peacekeeping intelligence?

There are four main reasons why investigating the use of intelligence in the UN is needed: First and foremost, there is a general need to determine UN capabilities for effectively stabilizing armed conflict and keeping a fragile peace. In the post-Cold War international system, the UN has taken on a key role as the world's only legitimate global custodian of peace and security (cf. Bellamy et al. 2004, Matlary 2006). This role implicitly designates the UN as an independent strategic actor in the international system. Based on established criteria of actorness, a *strategic* actor can be conceptualized as one that (1) has a capacity to formulate common security interests (ends), and (2) may generate relevant capabilities (means) which it has the resolve to use to promote these common interests (Norheim-Martinsen forthcoming).⁴ According to Article I of the UN Charter, the primary security interest (end) of the UN is “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take *effective collective measures* for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” (United Nations 1945:§1, emphasis added). These ‘collective measures’ sometimes involve managing and sustaining complex peace operations in highly fluid and insecure

³ This study can thus be read as a reply to Paul Pierson's appeal to move focus away from theories of institutional origins, which have been the dominant preoccupation of choice-theoretic accounts, and towards theories of institutional development (Pierson 2004:105).

⁴ Corresponding to these two criteria, Clausewitz (1991) defines strategy as “the bridge between ends and means”.

environments. However, the effectiveness of such collective measures is often compromised by problems of ‘collective action’.⁵ Consequently, generating the means necessary to successfully execute these operations has become a collective action problem for the UN. This is especially true within the area of intelligence, where multilateral cooperation is less likely than in most other policy areas, due to states’ general fear of compromising their national assets and sources (cf. Lefebvre 2003, Aldrich 2004, Chesterman 2006b, Sims 2006, Walsh 2006, 2007).

Secondly, there is a need to examine the intelligence-related concepts and bodies currently being developed in the UN in order to make better qualified judgments about their potential effect on UN intelligence capabilities. This study finds that there have recently been important changes in attitude among UN staff and member states towards the need for improved intelligence support to UN peace operations. This attitude-change has lately materialized into actual capability development, both at the field level, and at the UN headquarters (UNHQ). In the field, the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) has since May 2006 been a required component of all UN Integrated Missions (United Nations 2006b). In UNHQ, the Research and Liaison Unit (R&L Unit) in the Situation Centre has been operational since late 2007. In addition, the Assessment Team (A-team) in the Office of Military Affairs is in the process of being established. Hence, there is a need to question whether these entities represent only a passing fashion, or a permanent change, meaning that the organization has reached a political branching point in the area of PKI.

Thirdly, there is a need for more sophisticated theory development based on the pragmatically oriented narratives offered in the literature on PKI (see pp.11-13 for PKI literature review). Most of the literature addressing the use of intelligence in multilateral operations typically focuses on why more intelligence support is needed, and on how to improve existing arrangements. There are few systematic reflections offered on the underlying mechanisms restraining organizations such as the UN from

⁵ For a short and informative introduction to the problem of collective action, see Elster 1989, 124-134.

improving their intelligence capabilities. Even fewer accounts connect such reflections with existing theories on international relations and institutions. An analytical framework that synthesizes pragmatic accounts with more general theoretical assumptions is therefore much needed.

Finally, there is a need to clarify the relationship between ‘peacekeeping intelligence’ and traditional intelligence. In the intelligence literature, there is no general agreement on a precise definition of intelligence. In the literature on peacekeeping intelligence, there are few attempts of defining the concept, and existing definitions differ substantially. This study offers definitions of both concepts with the intention of illustrating how they relate to each other.

1.2 Main findings and thesis outline

By combining insights offered from the rationalist and historical approaches to new institutionalism, the first aim of the study is to develop an analytical framework that with a few key factors delineates the prospects for developing dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of multilateral peace operations, conducted within the framework of international institutions.⁶ The second aim of the study is to apply this analytical framework to the UN case in order to offer a qualified judgment on whether or not the UN has reached a critical juncture in the area of PKI.

To fruitfully shed light on the process under investigation, the study uses process-tracing as suggested in George and Bennet (2005). This is done through close examination of archival documents, relevant literature, and interviews conducted with relevant UN officials, scholars, practitioners and member state delegates.

The study limits itself to analyzing factors that are *distinctive* to international institutions such as the UN. In other words, challenges to the development of


⁶ The theoretical underpinnings of this analytical framework is inspired by the work of Björn Fägersten (2008) on multilateral intelligence cooperation in the EU, Paul Pierson’s (2004) approach to institutional development, as well as Barry R. Weingast’s (2007) rationalist-historical model for determining the circumstances in which critical junctures take place.

dedicated intelligence capabilities *not* distinctive to international institutions, such as human cognitive limitations, or other mechanisms leading to ‘intelligence failures,’ are not considered.

1.2.1 Main findings

How can we determine the prospects for developing permanent and dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of multilateral peace operations, conducted within the framework of international institutions? The central argument of the thesis is that primarily three key factors should be considered to that end: (1) the configuration of *member state interests* towards the idea of developing dedicated intelligence capabilities within a given international institution; (2) the distinctive *institutional framework* of that international institution; and (3) *process drivers* which are internal and external incontrollable forces that may cause a change in the circumstances within which the previous two factors are determined. The figure below delineates these three key factors and their relationships to each other:

Figure 1: Key factors to the development of intelligence support to multilateral peace operations



Member states are the ultimate decision-makers of international institutions. Therefore, the configuration of member state interests towards any policy process influences its prospects for success. Once the configuration of member state interests is determined, these interests may either be restrained or facilitated by the institutional framework within which they are framed. Finally, process drivers can drive the development of intelligence capabilities forward by changing the circumstances within which the two previous factors are determined.

Has the UN reached a critical juncture in the area of PKI? The findings indicate that the UN has indeed reached a critical juncture in the area of PKI, although it is too early to make definite conclusions. The analysis documents a recent and significant increase in the development of dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations. This increase specifically involves three units currently being developed within the structures of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO): the JMAC, the R&L Unit, and the A-team. Having examined these three units more in detail, they are all found to contribute positively to the overall intelligence capacity of the UN, although they have yet to reach their full potential.

Furthermore, the study finds that these recent developments to a large extent can be explained by changing circumstances in the operational environment of current peace operations, leading to threat balancing. As the security challenges faced by member states and institutional secretariats in peace operations changes, so do their policies towards these operations, also within sensitive policy areas such as PKI.

In addition, member states that used to be reluctant towards PKI are now starting to turn more positive, in particular countries from the Non Aligned Movement (NAM).⁷ The reasons are increasing participation by NAM countries in UN peace operations, as well as continuous PKI promoting efforts made by political entrepreneurs within the institutional framework of the UN. Considering the fact that most previous efforts of developing UN intelligence capabilities have been voted down or disbanded due to rejections from NAM-controlled member state committees, the NAM countries constitute a political pivot that, once turned, will cause a significant shift in UN policy. The findings indicate that this is now happening. Therefore, the study suggests that the UN has reached a critical juncture in the area of PKI, involving a significant change of UN policy.

⁷ NAM is a large grouping of UN member states, primarily consisting of developing countries. These states consider themselves not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc in the UN. However, when acting in accordance with each other they constitute their own power block with voting majority in the member state committees of the UN.

1.2.2 The thesis in outline

The remainder of this introductory chapter presents a short literature review of previous PKI research, defines intelligence and peacekeeping intelligence respectively, and then moves on to outline the intelligence requirements of UN peace operations. Chapter two introduces an analytical framework of intelligence support to multilateral peace operations, conducted within the framework of international institutions. Chapter three describes the research methodology employed in the study. Chapter four provides a historical review of the development of intelligence capabilities in the UN system, including the latest events. Chapter five applies the analytical framework to the UN case to look for consistency between the three proposed key factors and the empirical findings. Finally, chapter six offers theoretical and substantive interpretations of the findings, and concludes with the prospects for further developing dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations.

1.3 Setting the PKI stage: previous research, definitions, and requirements

The concept ‘peacekeeping intelligence’ (PKI) originates from a burgeoning field of study that has evolved throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium. Scholars and practitioners within this field are concerned with the role, dynamics and challenges of intelligence in peacekeeping activities, and place PKI in a wider social, economic, and political context (Carment and Rudner 2006:backcover).

1.3.1 Previous research

The PKI literature can be characterized by two qualities: (1) a high degree of consensus about the need to improve UN intelligence capabilities; and (2) a lack of theoretical virtue. Ever since Hugh Smith launched the PKI discourse with his article *Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping* in 1994, numerous scholars have contributed to an ongoing discussion on how to improve the intelligence capabilities of the UN (Ramsbotham 1995, Eriksson 1997, Johnston 1997, Välimäki 2000, Jong et al. 2003,

Steele 2004, 2006, Carment and Rudner 2006, Chesterman 2006b, Dorn 2007). What these scholars emphasize is the relevance of intelligence support to UN peace operations, and the conflicting relationship between the open nature of the UN and the covert nature of intelligence. The covert nature of intelligence has caused an internal resistance towards the development of UN intelligence capabilities, rooted in UN principles of transparency, impartiality, and the protection of human rights. Consequently, the UN lacks the intelligence capabilities required in current peace operations, and in order to meet these intelligence requirements, the organization is dependent on contributions from member states. However, due to the open and multilateral nature of the UN, member states are reluctant towards sharing their intelligence, afraid of compromising their own intelligence capabilities and/or sources to other member states. Therefore, to resolve this catch-22 situation, several PKI authors argue that Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), which rejects the covert elements of intelligence, may in a UN context constitute a fair substitute to an all-source intelligence capability (Cf. Smith 1994, Jong et al. 2003, Steele 2004, 2006, Carment and Rudner 2006). Thus, these authors suggest that the UN needs to develop intelligence capabilities predominantly based on OSINT, both at the Headquarters level in DPKO, and at the field level of operations. Others argue that OSINT cannot meet the intelligence requirements of current operations, where in particular aerial surveillance and signals intelligence (SIGINT) are singled out as additional relevant capabilities (cf. Dorn 2007).⁸

In addition to this general debate on PKI, four subgenres have emerged out of the PKI scholarship. First, a group of scholars and practitioners have examined the practical consequences of PKI, as opposed to intelligence support to traditional warfare (Eriksson et al. 1996, Jong et al. 2003). Secondly, some scholars have discussed the ethical and moral consequences of PKI (Dorn 1999, Gendron 2005, 2006). Thirdly, Walter Dorn has written two unique historical accounts of key PKI events: (1) intelligence support to the UN operation in Congo 1960-64 (Dorn and Bell 1995);

⁸ Signals Intelligence (SIGNINT) is “the generic term given to the process of deriving intelligence from intercepted electromagnetic waves, generally referred to as signals.” (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002:27).

and (2) intelligence from the UN Research and Liaison Unit on the crisis in Eastern Zaire 1996-97 (Dorn 2006). Finally, some scholars have debated whether or not the UN actually has intelligence capabilities (Chesterman 2006a, Epke 2007). The latest publication on PKI, and the only one with exclusive focus on JMAC, is an article by Philip Shetler-Jones, arguing that the JMAC objective of integrating senior level management has not been fully realized for the time being (Shetler-Jones 2008).

While many of these contributions highlight reasons why intelligence is problematic in the UN context, little effort has been devoted to developing a common theory of PKI that connects empirical accounts with existing theories on international relations and institutions. As a result, the PKI literature suffers from theoretical malnutrition, and offers no common analytical platform from which scholars can be assisted in developing better explanations of the PKI phenomenon. In addition, the PKI literature suffers from an inconsistent use of the terms intelligence and peacekeeping intelligence respectively. The ambition here is to fill some of these gaps. PKI can be understood as a sub-category of intelligence. Therefore, before defining peacekeeping intelligence, it is necessary to define intelligence.

1.3.2 Defining intelligence

Within the intelligence literature there is no general agreement on a precise definition of intelligence. This is not strange, given the wide and increasing array of actors and activities commonly associated with intelligence. Clausewitz defined intelligence as “every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short of our own plans and operations” (in George and Kline 2006:3). In modern times, intelligence has traditionally been associated with the state and the protection of national security and sovereignty. However, the idea of retrieving information about the enemy is much older than the Westphalian state system. For example, in the Bible, one can read the following passage: “¹And Joshua the son of Nun sent two men secretly from Shittim as spies, saying, ‘Go, view the land, especially Jericho’” (The Bible, Joshua 2:1). Another pre-Westphalian reference to intelligence can be found in

the writings of the famous military strategist Sun Tsu, who in the early fourth century BC recognized that:

3. The reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. (...)

23. And therefore only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things. Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move (in Griffith 1963:144-49).

Sherman Kent, one of the pioneering American intelligence scholars, claim that there are “three separate and distinct things that intelligence devotees usually mean when they use the word:” (1) a kind of knowledge; (2) the type of organization which produces the knowledge; and (3) the activity pursued by the intelligence organization (Kent 1949:ix). Kent’s definition is often referred to in the intelligence literature, but can be criticized for being too general. Michael Herman, another recognized American intelligence scholar, draws on Kent’s second characteristic when he describes intelligence as a particular kind of state power: *intelligence power*. According to Herman, this kind of governmental power rests upon a system of organized information-gathering, analysis and forecasting, which serves governments’ executive functions (Herman 1996:379). Gill and Phythian attempt to assemble all loose ends with their somewhat lengthy definition:

Intelligence is the umbrella term referring to the range of activities – from planning and information collection to analysis and dissemination – conducted in secret, and aimed at maintaining or enhancing relative security by providing forewarning of threats or potential threats in a manner that allows for the timely implementation of a preventive policy or strategy, including, where deemed desirable, covert action (Gill and Phythian 2006:7).

By reviewing a number of definitions and descriptions of intelligence, one can extract key characteristics that are frequently included. Five characteristics are discernible, although only three of them are included in the definition of intelligence employed in this thesis:

First, the primary purpose of intelligence is to *inform* decision-makers. The American Joint Intelligence Doctrine JP 2-0, describes intelligence operations as “wide-ranging activities conducted by intelligence staffs and organizations for the purpose of providing commanders and national-level decision makers with relevant, accurate,

and timely intelligence” (Joint Publication 2-0 2007:x). This informative function can be obtained in two ways: (1) A decision-maker issues a specific request for information that the intelligence organization is tasked to produce; or (2) the decision-maker has defined security interests that can be served through prediction of future events that may influence these interests, a task also commonly delegated to intelligence services. Thus, intelligence involves informing decision-makers on past, present and future events, related to their security interests.⁹

A second characteristic of intelligence is the actual *process* of making an intelligence product, commonly referred to as the ‘intelligence cycle’. The intelligence cycle is usually described through five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information (Gill and Phythian 2006:2).

Thirdly, there is an element of *secrecy*. Once the information has been collected, processed, and analyzed, it has become an intelligence product. At this point, it constitutes a unique piece of information with a certain relevance and value, both to the decision-maker, and to his adversaries. Therefore, this piece of information must be protected given that the security interests of the decision-maker conflicts with those of other actors. Intelligence, thus, becomes a commodity that can only be traded for a certain prize, with information as the hard currency. Moreover, this information is sometimes collected from secret sources through covert methods. Therefore, the information must also be protected in order not to reveal one’s sources and/or intelligence capabilities to the “others”.

Fourthly, there is an element of *legal exemption*. A national intelligence organization typically enjoys legal rights beyond those of most other governmental organizations, and certainly beyond those of the common members of society. These special rights may vary from state to state, but most national intelligence services do embark on activities that would land other people in prison. Of course, this legal exemption is

⁹ Security interests is here understood in its wider sense, in line with the theory of securitization from the Copenhagen School (see Buzan and de Wilde 1998, Buzan and Wæver 2003, Wæver 2007).

only valid within the legal jurisdictions of one's own country. This is somewhat paradoxical, considering the fact that many of the activities undertaken by national intelligence services take place on foreign territories. However, operating in legal grey zones is not a necessary premise for calling something intelligence. Many intelligence activities are conducted within the legal parameters of both national and international law. In addition, the majority of intelligence products rest on analysis of open, and thus legal, sources. Therefore, this characteristic is rejected as determining for a constructive and dynamic definition of intelligence.

A fifth commonly used characteristic of intelligence is that the concept is closely associated with the *state* and directed towards the protection of national security and sovereignty. Shulsky and Smith (2002:1) describe intelligence as “information relevant to a government’s formulating and implementing policy to further national security interests and to deal with threats to those interests from actual potential adversaries”. However, this characteristic is also rejected. Good conceptual definitions survive the passing of time. Considering that the Westphalian state system only marks a relatively short time span in human history, and the fact that intelligence activities have been around for much longer, one should avoid the state premise in a dynamic definition of intelligence. What is more, in today’s world one can easily identify non-state actors that embark on intelligence activities. Multinational corporations are becoming increasingly active within the world of business intelligence (Markhus 2005). Terrorist organizations such as Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Taliban, and al-Qaida are all known to have their own intelligence groups (Chalk 2000, Yousafzai et al. 2006). Private research institutions and think tanks such as Rand Corporation and Janes Information Group are often portrayed as highly regarded intelligence producers. Finally, the fast growing industry of private security- and intelligence companies represent non-state actors clearly engaged in intelligence activities.¹⁰

¹⁰ One example is the Norwegian company *Scandinavian Business Intelligence AS* (www.sbi-as.com/en)

Thus, instead of relating the intelligence concept to the state notion, focusing on the *decision-maker* would serve a constructive and dynamic definition of intelligence. Being a decision-maker implies having the power to decide over others. Thus, the decision-maker posits certain power tools with which he may execute his decision-making powers. Intelligence can be understood as one such power tool, which corresponds well with Herman's (1996) understanding of intelligence as a type of power, only without the state connection. Intelligence, then, can be understood as *a power tool used to generate information relevant to the security interests of a decision-maker through the collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of information, both overt and covert, on past, present and future events, and the protection of the final product and its sources from other competing actors.*¹¹

1.3.3 Defining peacekeeping intelligence

Having clarified what is meant by intelligence in this study, we shall move on to define peacekeeping intelligence. What may seem surprising to some is that while intelligence can be detached from the state, peacekeeping intelligence is by definition a product of our present state system, and therefore closely associated with the state concept. Peacekeeping only takes place when a state relies on outside interference to effectively carry out certain governmental responsibilities, typically in the period between a ceasefire and a political settlement. The intervening actor is usually a multilateral group of states conceived as a legitimate intervener by the world community. Moreover, the operation is typically organized within the framework of an international institution, most often the UN. Therefore, in this study, peacekeeping intelligence is defined as *intelligence support to multilateral peace operations conducted within the framework of international institutions.*¹²

¹¹ This definition would include non-state actors not traditionally associated with intelligence such as multinational corporations, terrorist organizations, private companies and international organizations.

¹² This definition would include actors such as NATO, the African Union and the European Union. However, the relevant operation must be a *peace* operation. How to define peace operations is a contested issue that is not within the scope of this study. However, a central issue for such qualification would be that of legitimacy.

1.3.4 Intelligence requirements of UN peace operations

Before moving on to discussing what key factors may determine the prospects for developing intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations, a consideration of the actual intelligence requirements of these operations serves to set the stage. Therefore, this section summarizes some of the arguments put forward in the PKI literature. It offers a short survey on the intelligence requirements of UN peace operations.¹³ It is not meant as an exhaustive list of all requirements and considerations, but rather as a digest that gives some indication of the intelligence requirements for effective mission performance. Effective mission performance is here operationalized as upholding the mission mandate as determined by the Security Council. Consequently, the intelligence requirements for effective mission performance may vary across missions. However, although each UN peace operation is different, there is a considerable degree of consistency in the types of mandated tasks assigned by the Security Council (United Nations 2008d:17).

Given the continued presence and important role of military elements in current peace operations, the insights of military theory can be helpful in understanding the dynamics of effective mission performance. Therefore, when discussing intelligence requirements for effective mission performance, the arguments are structured around the three levels of war commonly used in military literature: the strategic, the operational, and the tactical. As operations grow in size and complexity, it becomes more challenging to connect the political and strategic objectives of an operation with tactical planning of ground activities, and vice versa. Therefore, the operational level of war was conceptually developed in order to connect the strategic objectives of large wars with the activities and tactics on the ground.

Successful implementation of mission mandates requires considerations from all three levels of war/operation. Each level has its own purpose and logic, and requires

¹³ This section is largely based on my own fusion of existing PKI literature, in addition to the American Joint Chiefs of Staff's (JCS) Joint Publication 2-0 (2007) on intelligence support to military operations, as well as the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF) Joint Operational Doctrine (2007)

different types of information and intelligence. One may, in other words, talk of strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, and tactical intelligence. However, there is no clear distinction between the three levels of operation. Information collected at the tactical level may have strategic consequences and vice versa.

Strategic intelligence in peace operations is information that may bring about a significant change in the conditions that define a pending or ongoing operation (cf. Joint Operational Doctrine 2007:145). The timeframe of the analysis will vary from long term strategic assessments of future possible scenarios, to relatively long term assessments of ongoing operations including exit and peacebuilding strategies, and direct day-to-day strategic support of ongoing missions.¹⁴ The information can be of military, political, economical, societal or environmental nature (Smith 1994).

There are three main objectives of strategic intelligence (cf. Steele 2003:394): Firstly, there is a requirement for an efficient *early warning system* that monitors political processes and looming conflict situations on a worldwide basis. A high quality early warning system would help the UN to more effectively determine where and when to intervene. Ideally, good early warning assessments could also contribute to preventive action hindering the outbreak of violent conflicts. Secondly, there is a requirement for effective *mission planning*, once intervention has been decided upon. Military as well as civilian UN departments and agencies are dependent on good and timely intelligence about the conflict area in order to quickly work out the best possible mission concept. Thirdly, there is a requirement to deliver *strategic mission support* once a mission has been deployed. When missions are up and running, DPKO has to make sure that the activities undertaken by UN peacekeepers overlap the mission mandate. In addition, intelligence collected in the field might have important strategic relevance, and DPKO therefore needs an intelligence unit to process and analyze information from the field.

¹⁴ One limitation of strategic intelligence would be that Security Council mandates are usually given for no longer than six months to a year, which undermines long-term strategic planning.

Operational intelligence in peace operations is information that has consequences for an ongoing peace operation within a defined geographical area (Eriksson et al. 1996:31). It is typically collected within the conflict area and delivered to the mission headquarters (HQ), where it is digested and forwarded to DPKO if the information has strategic relevance. The timeframe of the analysis is characterized by short term assessments about the current and possible upcoming conditions of the operation. The main objectives of operational intelligence can be divided into two types of information requirements: military information and situational awareness (Steele 2003:406).

Military information is required to ensure the safety and security of civilians and mission personnel. In peace operations, information is required about the military capabilities and intentions of the contending factions in the conflict area. It involves identifying arms caches, levels of armaments, intentions and strategies, and monitoring of adversary troop movements (Smith 1994). In addition, information relevant to the protection of transport, supplies, UN facilities and equipment, and the freedom of movement, is collected at the operational level. Arguably, the successful implementation of these tasks requires the same type of intelligence support that is normally provided in regular warfare, but on a smaller format. Thus, operational intelligence should be based on an all-source analysis process, in which all intelligence disciplines contribute (Joint Publication 2-0 2007).

Situational awareness is required to more effectively carry out the wide variety of mission mandates assigned by the Security Council. The operational environment is determined by a range of elements that may influence effective mission performance. Accordingly, situational awareness implies a holistic understanding of the operational environment. First of all, an historical and contextual understanding of the conflict, its adversaries, and the local population is necessary (Steele 2003:393). Moreover, situational awareness involves understanding local politics and culture as well as the socio-economic situation in the conflict area. In addition, such factors as local climate, language, infrastructure, communications, demography, geography, topography, local diseases, transport routes, water and electricity supplies, and local

hospitals may be pertinent to effective mission performance (Smith 1994). Wireless interception capabilities, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and aerial reconnaissance have proved to be effective means for collection of operational intelligence (Cammaert 2003:22). Counterintelligence may also be a necessary activity at the operational level in order to ensure the effectiveness of the missions' own intelligence activities, as well as to detect intelligence capabilities of the adversaries (Cammaert 2003). Sometimes the contending parties have more advanced intelligence capabilities than the UN forces (see Dorn 2007). Finally, in many conflict areas crime and corruption have a strong impact on the operational environment, and must therefore be monitored and reported on (Van Diepenbrugge 2003:34).

Tactical intelligence in peace operations is concerned with conditions with direct relevance to the deployed forces in the conflict area (Eriksson et al. 1996:31). It is primarily intended to serve the lower command of the operation. The timeframe of the analysis is short and focus is on small details and indications of changes in the local environment including military activity, the political situation, and local attitudes towards UN peacekeepers and humanitarian agents. The main objective of tactical intelligence is to assess the parties of the conflict as potential threats to the effective implementation of mission mandates (Smith 1994). This involves observation of troop withdrawals, breaches of ceasefires, arms embargoes, and peace agreements. In addition, tactical intelligence gathers information about technical and practical conditions of relevance to the peacekeepers such as the direct effects of weather and terrain (Eriksson et al. 1996:32).

Human intelligence (HUMINT), which is information collected and provided by human sources, is particularly relevant at the tactical level. It is thus at this level that local cultural affinities may be observed, such as specific values and taboos (Aid 2003:140). Technological equipment such as digital cameras, video cameras, and monitoring equipment are important for the collection of tactical intelligence (Cammaert 2003:28).

2. Theory

This chapter presents the analytical framework which in chapter five is applied to the UN case. The framework is largely built on insights offered by the rationalist and historical versions of new institutionalism. The first section of the chapter briefly outlines new institutionalism in general, and the relationship between rationalist and historical institutionalism more specifically. The second section draws on insights offered by these approaches to construct an analytical framework that, with recourse to a few key factors, delineates the prospects for developing intelligence capabilities in support of multilateral peace operations, conducted within the framework of international institutions.

2.1 New institutionalism

The term ‘new institutionalism’ is derived from the works of James March and Johan P. Olsen (1984, 1989, 1995, 2002, 2005). In their 1984 article, March and Olsen argue that modern political scientists have “failed to treat political institutions as independent factors, important to the ordering and understanding of collective life” (March and Olsen 1984:735). New institutionalism marks a renewed interest in the role of institutions and institutionalization in the understanding of human actions within an organization, social order, or society (March and Olsen 2005:949).

Implicit to this renewed interest in institutions is an *old* interest, an ‘old institutionalism’. According to B. Guy Peters (1999), the roots of political science can be found in the study of institutions, and be traced back to political philosophers such as Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Montesquieu and Woodrow Wilson: “Going back even to antiquity and the first systematic thinking about political life, the primary questions asked by scholars tended to concern the nature of the governing institutions that could structure the behavior of individuals – both the governing and the governed – towards better ends” (Peters 1999:3). However, this old institutionalist tradition was interrupted by the ‘behavioralist revolution’ in the 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, during the 1960s and 1970s, behavioralism and rational choice theory

became the dominating paradigms of political science. These schools of thought did not put much emphasis on the role of institutions in political life. What they did, however, was to give the whole discipline of political science a theoretical and methodological overhaul. As a result, the new institutionalism, although reflecting many features of the old institutionalism, has been reinforced with the research tools and the explicit concern for theory introduced by both behavioralism and rational choice (Peters 1999:1). Thus, March and Olsen (2005:738) describe new institutionalism as a blend of elements from old institutionalism and the non-institutionalist styles of recent political theory.

The rationalist version of new institutionalism explains the emergence and survival of institutions from a functional point of view. Rather than addressing the question whether or not institutions matter, this approach focuses on investigating how institutions function and how they relate to state preferences. Thus, a rational institutionalist would argue that institutions emerge and survive because they fulfill important functions for utility-maximizing states, acting out of self interest (Pollack 2003). In addition, rational institutionalists also emphasize how institutions induce mechanisms for channeling and constraining behavior (Weingast 2002). Accordingly, states may realize that their goals can be achieved more effectively through institutional action, and therefore find their behavior to be shaped by institutions (Peters 1999:44). Rationalist theory has been criticized for making too general assumptions about human rationality and preference formation. Among these critics are the historical institutionalists.

The historical version of new institutionalism focuses on how choices taken in the past may affect the prospects for subsequent policy outcomes. The historical institutionalist would criticize the rationalists institutionalist for taking a 'snapshot view' of reality and thus risk drawing erroneous conclusions about actors' preferences or institutional outcomes (Pierson 2004:104). Instead, historical institutionalists focus on the historical legacy of institutions and argue that institutional choices taken in the past can persist and thereby shape and constrain actors at a later time, often referred to as path dependency (Krasner 1984, Pierson

2000). Thus, historical institutionalists are more concerned with how preferences are formed and can be used to explain specific institutional outcomes, than with how these preferences determine institutional functions in a more systematic fashion.

Several authors assert that there is a possible synergy between the rationalist and historical the versions of new institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996, Pierson 2004, Katznelson and Weingast 2007). While rationalist accounts come short of explaining human motivation and *ex ante* preference formation, historical accounts provide little analytical rigor in explaining exactly how institutions affect behavior (Hall and Taylor 1996:950). Moreover, although rationalist institutionalism has great potential for explaining why institutions continue to persist, it is not as successful in explaining the origins of institutions, or institutional changes over time. In contrast, historical institutionalism can, by means of induction and close examination of historical records, discriminate between competing explanations of institutional origins and change, and for each case select the one with the highest explanatory power. However, this emphasis on induction and thick narratives may also represent a weakness because it makes it more difficult “to aggregate findings into systematic theories about the general processes involved in institutional creation and change” (Hall and Taylor 1996:955). Therefore, these scholars point to the fact that the weakness of one approach can be compensated for by the strengths of the other. In other words, there is room for a useful dialogue between the two variants.

A central concept used by many historical institutionalists is that of critical junctures. A critical juncture takes place when “a major disclosure occurs in society, such as when people abandon previous views and come to hold new ones sufficiently different that the direction of politics transforms significantly” (Weingast 2007:171). To demonstrate points of intersection between rationalist and historical institutionalism, Barry R. Weingast (2007) applies this concept originally developed by historical institutionalists, in rational choice terms, and develops a formal model that predicts the circumstances in which discontinuous political change take place. Weingast’s purpose for doing this is twofold: First, to draw on a central concept from historical institutionalism - critical junctures - to enrich rational choice theory.

Second, to draw on rational choice theory to provide the microfoundations for critical junctures, traditionally known as a macroscopic principle for historical institutionalists (Weingast 2007:161).

The theoretical foundation and dynamics of Weingast's model has much in common with the analytical framework, or model, proposed in this study. First, the main objective of both models is to predict circumstances for political change with a few key factors. Weingast's model is developed to study significant shifts in preferences in colonial America. The model proposed here is developed to study significant shifts in preferences towards PKI.

Weingast's model assumes the existence of a pivotal decision-maker, whose support is necessary to preserve the status quo. In the case of the UN, the pivotal decision-maker would be a combination of the UN Secretariat and the member states, more specifically, NAM countries, who have the majority in the most important decision-making organs of the UN, except for the SC. Weingast also assumes that actors have a mental model of the political world in which they live and, further, that one particular model – the prevailing idea – dominates in the sense that most actors share this model about their world. In the context of this study, the prevailing idea would be that the development of intelligence capabilities within the UN system constitutes a threat to the open nature of the UN, as well as to member states' autonomy and vulnerability, and should therefore be limited. This prevailing idea has implications for which policies that will succeed. In the UN case, the prevailing idea has undermined the mission performance of several UN peace operations. In addition, there may be one or more new or challenging ideas that represent alternative mental models for interpreting the world and typically have very different policy consequences than the prevailing idea. In this case, that new idea would involve recognizing the absolute necessity of providing intelligence support to UN peace operations, and the fact that UN intelligence capabilities do not necessarily constitute a threat towards the nature of the UN, or to the autonomy or vulnerability of member states.

Finally, Weingast assumes that, at some initial period, a prevailing idea dominates the society, but at the same time, various political entrepreneurs attempt to persuade others that the new idea should replace the prevailing idea. In the UN case, the initial period that lasted from the beginning of UN peacekeeping and well into the new millennium, was marked by an aversion towards UN intelligence, both among UN staff and member states. The political entrepreneurs that have tried to replace this initial paradigm can be found within the institutional framework of the UN, in the form of UN departments, agencies, and units, as well as individuals in powerful positions, as is discussed more in detail in chapter five.

The critically important part of Weingast's model is the political pivotal actor whose decision about whether or not to support the prevailing idea, or a new challenging idea, determines whether the new idea remains stable or not. As documented later, the NAM countries were initially against the development of UN intelligence capabilities, but have recently adjusted their strategies due to changing circumstances; most importantly they have substantially increased their participation in UN peace operations, and are learning the negative consequences of not having the required intelligence support. According to Weingast, the model draws on a simple approach to learning under uncertainty:


Associated with each new idea is a probability π that it is true. For most ideas, π is sufficiently low so that few people beyond a small cadre of advocates take it seriously. But on occasion, the right combination of new ideas and events persuade a much larger group to support the new idea. The approach is designed to suggest the conditions under which the political pivot will switch allegiance from supporting the prevailing idea to the new idea. The model shows that, for a pair of prevailing and challenging ideas, there is a critical probability threshold, π^* , such that the political pivot will switch to embrace the new idea and its policy consequences if the probability that the idea is true rises above the critical threshold, i.e., when $\pi > \pi^*$ (Weingast 2007:163).

For π , (the probability that PKI is a prerequisite to UN peace operations) to rise above its initially low level, evidence must emerge that makes the idea more likely to be true. In that case, a critical juncture may have been reached.

2.2 Modelling the prospects for PKI

The central argument of this thesis is that the prospects for developing dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of multilateral peace operations, conducted within the framework of international institutions, can be determined primarily by three key factors: (1) the configuration of *member state interests* towards the idea of establishing dedicated intelligence capabilities within a given international institution; (2) the distinctive *institutional framework* of that institution; and (3) *process drivers* which are internal and external incontrollable forces that may cause a change in the circumstances within which the previous two factors are determined. These three factors are in this study operationalized as illustrated in the following model:

Figure 2: Prospects for developing intelligence support to multilateral peace operations



2.2.1 Member state interests

In international institutions such as the UN, the EU, and NATO, the member states are the ultimate decision-makers. Therefore, the development of any capability within a given international institution will only be prosperous as long as the member states support it.

Indicators of member state interests are challenging to define and measure. The reason is that most member states do not publicly formulate their interests towards the policy area of PKI. Instead, this factor can be assessed by estimating how rationally behaving states, motivated by a strategic cost-benefit calculation, are likely to act towards PKI, given their relative position in the international system.

Moreover, insights from interview informants with intimate knowledge about the behavior of member states towards PKI can also serve as an indicator of the configuration of member state interests.

Member states can be motivated to develop intelligence capabilities within the framework of international institutions in order to achieve *intelligence gains*, but also to score *policy gains*. Developing intelligence capabilities within international institutions is demanding because empowering international institutions in the area of intelligence challenges the autonomy and vulnerability of member states. Therefore, member states are going to need motives for allowing such development to take place.

Assuming that states behave rationally towards this policy area, one can conceptualize the configuration of member state interests as a cost-benefit calculation. To that end, Jennifer Sims (2006) has created a framework for analyzing and comparing the costs and benefits of foreign intelligence liaison under varying international circumstances. Sims distinguishes between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ liaison, where the former only involves exchange of intelligence goods among the concerned parties, while the latter involves bartering of intelligence assets for some mix of political, intelligence, military, or operational goods. Accordingly, multilateral intelligence cooperation can be motivated by a desire to achieve pure intelligence gains, but also by other more politically driven concerns. As Sims argues, “preferences of intelligence professionals will tend to take a back seat to political or military necessity if the purpose of the intelligence liaison is simply to bolster political or military alliances initiated for nonintelligence reasons” (Sims 2006:202). Transferred to the context of international institutions, member states can be motivated to develop intelligence capabilities for both intelligence and nonintelligence reasons. In addition, states may be motivated to participate in cooperation in order to influence other states by submitting intelligence products that support specific political views, ideas, or ideologies.

On the cost side of the equation, the costs of cooperation tend to rise as the number of parties increase (Sims 2006:202). This mechanism would have a negative effect on states' motivation for developing intelligence capabilities within international institutions with large member state bodies. What is more, democratic states with free media and open courts are often considered unreliable intelligence partners, due to risks of media leaks and judicial oversight (Sims 2006:205). Therefore, states' motivation for developing intelligence capabilities within international institutions founded on principles of liberal-democracy, transparency, and the protection of human rights, is bound to be limited. Finally, creating a joint venture within the callous world of intelligence will always involve risks of manipulation, penetration and deception on behalf of the other parties.

Drawing on Sims framework of costs and benefits, Björn Fägersten (2008) has conceptualized the configuration of state interests towards multilateral intelligence cooperation in the European Union as a trade-off between *intelligence* and *policy gains* and *autonomy* and *vulnerability costs*. Fägersten argues that an autonomy cost would involve any development that challenges states' authority, either in their internal or external affairs. Moreover, within the realm of intelligence, states fear having their capabilities and sources compromised. Therefore, a vulnerability cost is defined as "a product of the probability and consequences of a disclosure of a country's methods and sources, or the defection by a partner" (Fägersten 2008:21). These two types of costs are then balanced against the potential benefits of cooperation before deciding whether or not to cooperate. This study adopts Fägersten's conceptualization of state interests towards intelligence cooperation. Arguably, establishing intelligence capabilities within international institutions is ultimately a question of multilateral cooperation, and this conceptualization should therefore be transferable to the framework of this study.

To summarize, states will only support the development of intelligence capabilities within international institutions in cases where materially and/or politically driven benefits outweigh the costs of cooperation. In situations where the costs and benefits are balanced, there is little room for development. Lastly, if the costs of cooperation

outweigh the benefits, states will try to hold back development and/or dismantle existing arrangements until equilibrium is reached.

2.2.2 The Institutional framework

Once the configuration of member state interests has been determined, these interests may be either restrained or facilitated by the institutional framework of the international institution within which they are framed. Operating within an international institution introduces both *barriers* and *catalysts* to the development of intelligence capabilities.¹⁵ Accordingly, one can explain the effects from the institutional framework on the development of intelligence capabilities as a cost-benefit calculation between institutional barriers and catalysts. There are in particular three types of barriers that may obstruct effective development of intelligence capabilities within international institutions: institutional resilience; institutional bureaucratic resistance; and organizational culture.

In this study, *institutional resilience* refers to two dynamics: ‘veto points’ and legal obstacles. First, the design of institutional decision-making structures creates a number of veto points at which there must be a positive decision for a political process to go forward. The effects of veto points on institutional outcomes are well documented by the rational choice scholarship, but have also been referred to by historical institutionalists as an important mechanism for understanding problems of institutional development (cf. Immergut 1990, Tsebelis 2002, Pierson 2004). The more veto points, the more demanding it becomes to drive a political process forward. Thus, the development of intelligence capabilities within international institutions may be obstructed by vetoes from budgetary committees, review boards, general assemblies etc., depending on the decision-making structure of a given institution.

¹⁵ In a general sense, anything that increases the rate of a process is a "catalyst", a term derived from Greek καταλύειν, meaning "to annul," or "to untie," or "to pick up".

Secondly, the leeway of institutional action may be limited due to legal barriers, in particular when operating in foreign territories. When conducting peace operations, international institutions generally respect the national laws of the host nations. Therefore, when operating in foreign territories, there are limitations to the types of means and activities an international institution may undertake. In the case of developing intelligence capabilities in support of peace operations, there are a number of methods and activities commonly associated with intelligence in which international institutions can not engage, due to legal obstacles imposed by the host nation.

Indicators of institutional resilience serving as a barrier to the development of intelligence capabilities would be: (1) when development is obstructed by actors with veto rights; or (2) when development/application of intelligence capabilities in the operational theatre is held back due to legal obstacles imposed by the host nation

The second barrier, *institutional bureaucratic resistance*, refers to problems of information sharing and internal positioning within departments and agencies of a given institution. This point draws on insights offered by the literature on bureaucratic politics and organizational process (cf. Allison 1969, 1971, Halperin et al. 1974). In this literature, the outcomes produced by large decision-making bureaucracies are often viewed as a result of a bargaining process between multiple players involved in a ‘decision-making game’. These actors may not have the same mandates, information sources, or agendas, which make decision-making more of a random exercise than what is often assumed by rational choice scholars. Moreover, bureaucrats and practitioners have a tendency to act upon their own interests to position themselves internally, irrespectively of *the* interest of their ‘mother institution’. The bureaucracies of large institutions contain vast amounts of information that for intelligence reasons should be actively shared across departments and agencies. Therefore, institutional bureaucratic resistance may obstruct the development of intelligence capabilities in international institutions whenever actors withhold important information, or at least do not actively share, which is a prerequisite for effective intelligence exploitation.

Indicators of institutional bureaucratic resistance serving as a barrier to the developing intelligence capabilities in international institutions would be if development of intelligence capabilities functions poorly due to: (1) lack of internal information sharing; or (2) problems of internal coordination and cooperation across departments and agencies.

Finally, the *organizational culture(s)* of an institution can obstruct the development of intelligence capabilities within an international institution for two reasons: First, if the nature of these capabilities conflict with the nature of the institution's dominant culture. Secondly, if there are multiple and conflicting organizational cultures within a given institution. Andrew Brown (1995) defines organizational culture as "ideas, values and activities that are specific to a given organization and have special relevance to its members". The dominant organizational culture of the UN can be characterized by basic principles such as transparency, liberal-democracy, impartiality, and the protection of human rights. Therefore, some would argue that the covert nature of intelligence conflicts with the dominant organizational culture of the UN. Consequently, one would expect a series of ethical dilemmas to crop up, once an organization such as the UN engages with intelligence activities.

Moreover, one can expect significant cultural clashes when military elements are being incorporated into predominantly civilian organizations. Studies of organizational culture point to the multiple cultures within a single organization, some of which may undermine the organization's dominant culture (Martin and Siehl 1989, Ott 1989). The organizational cultures of international institutions such as the UN and the EU are predominantly civilian, in contrast to the military culture of organizations such as NATO. A large body of literature exists on the problem of civil-military cooperation (cf. Huntington 1957, Janowitz 1960, Feaver and Kohn 2001, Egnell 2006, Norheim-Martinsen forthcoming). Important here is that effective intelligence exploitation in support of peace operations rests on an integrated effort of both military and civilian expertise and knowledge (de Coning 2005, 2007). Therefore, civil-military cooperation and integration is a prerequisite for developing effective intelligence capabilities in support of multilateral peace operations.

Indicators of organizational culture serving as a barrier to the developing intelligence capabilities in international institutions would be: (1) if development/application of intelligence capabilities is being held back due to ethical dilemmas rooted in the dominant organizational culture of an international institution; (2) if the level of integrated development is low to due prevalence of either civilian or military organizational cultures within an institution or institutional body.

International institutions not only introduce barriers to the development of dedicated intelligence capabilities, they can also function as catalysts, facilitating an otherwise troublesome process. There are in particular three types of catalysts that may facilitate effective development of intelligence capabilities within international institutions: coordination facilitation; institutional entrepreneurship; and individual entrepreneurship.

Coordination facilitation can serve as helpful mechanism to the problem of collective action. Assuming that states can be analyzed as rational actors driven by self-interest, scholars from the tradition of neoliberal institutionalism argue that international institutions facilitate cooperation between states towards desired policy outcomes. More specifically, institutions can help states reach optimal solutions by providing an arena for information sharing, compliance monitoring, and articulation of states' expectations on a cooperative solution (Keohane 1984, 1989, Keohane and Martin 1995). In terms of developing dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of multilateral peace operations, international institutions provide an arena in which member states can share information and intelligence in order to promote their own interests. Moreover, state neutral institutional secretariats and bodies may function as fair and objective compliance monitors of the PKI policy process. Finally, international institutions provide a channel through which member states can articulate their interests towards establishing intelligence capabilities within the framework of a given institution.

Indicators of coordination facilitation in the area of PKI would be: (1) when member states share intelligence with international institutions because they conceive of them

as useful tools for promoting their own interests; (2) when oversight of intelligence activities is delegated by member states to institutional secretariats or bodies; or (3) when member states articulate their interest of developing intelligence capabilities within the framework of a given institution.

The second catalyst, *institutional entrepreneurship*, refers to how state neutral institutional secretariats or bodies may drive development forward by writing proposals, reports, and policy suggestions relevant to the issue at hand. Originally, the concept of institutional entrepreneurship was used to explain the activity underlying the creation of new institutions by creating new systems of meanings (DiMaggio 1988). However, this concept should also be transferable to explain institutional change (Clemens and Cook 1999, Levy and Scully 2007). Large organizations such as the UN, the EU, and NATO, also have large secretariats and other institutional bodies, working more or less independently of the member state interests. These actors are often more concerned with the interests of their corresponding organization, than with the preferences of member states. Thus, once these actors come to realize that good intelligence support is required for effective mission performance, which is in the interest of any institution engaged in peace operations, they are likely to push forward the development of such capabilities.

Therefore, an indicator of institutional entrepreneurship would be when the development of intelligence capabilities to a large extent builds on proposals, reports, and policy suggestions made by state neutral secretariats or bodies within the framework of a given international institution.

Finally, rationalist scholars also focus on the ability of *individual entrepreneurs* to drive development forward and cause institutional change (Schickler 2001). This issue can be related to the whole structure-agency debate, raising questions about whether it is the institution that shapes the behavior of the individual, or whether institutions are formed and reformed by individual action (Dessler 1989). The answer probably lies in a combination of the two arguments. What is relevant for the discussion at hand is that some individuals in powerful positions are likely to have the

ability to influence the prospects for developing dedicated intelligence capabilities within international institutions, in particular at the field level of operations.

Thus, an indicator of individual entrepreneurship would be when the development of intelligence capabilities within an international organization can be traced back to specific individuals involved in the policy process.

2.2.3 Process drivers

The configuration of member state interests in the area of PKI, and the corresponding institutional framework these interests are framed within, can to a large extent determine the prospects for developing intelligence capabilities within a given international institution. However, there are both external and internal uncontrollable forces that may cause a change in the circumstances within which these two factors are determined, namely a third key factor: *process drivers*. In particular two types of process drivers are relevant to the issue at hand: threat balancing and policy momentum.

Threat balancing refers to how actors continuously adjust their policies to new or changing security challenges (Buzan et al. 1998, Buzan and Wæver 2003, Wæver 2007). Thus, as the perceived threat scenarios change, the incentives for developing intelligence capabilities will also change. Member states that participate actively in peace operations are likely to adjust their attitude towards PKI because their troops may be undermined and endangered due to lack of sufficient intelligence support. Similarly, the secretariats, departments, and agencies of international institutions involved in peace operations are likely to adjust their policies towards PKI as these operations turn more robust and complex, and the corresponding requirements for intelligence support become more critical.

Thus, indicators of threat balancing would be: (1) if the development of new intelligence capabilities is preceded by a change in the perceived security threats; and (2) when the character of the developing capabilities corresponds to the specific challenges that are faced.

The second process driver, *policy momentum*, is generated by the development process itself. This mechanism can be found in both functional spillover theory and in historical institutionalism. Functional spillover theory focuses on how solutions in one policy area require additional action in other policy areas, and has been used in particular to explain developments in European integration (Haas 1968, Lindberg 1963, Schmitter 1969). In contrast, historical institutionalists interpret these mechanisms as unintended consequences rather than strategic choices (Pierson 1996, 2000, 2004). As the development of intelligence capabilities proceeds, states' incentives for contributing to these arrangements should increase as they become more relevant and successful. In addition, once these capabilities become established, states may realize that they constitute less of a threat to their autonomy and vulnerability than initially assumed, because they will predominantly be using open sources of information. What is more, supporting a policy process that is unfolding and conceived by an increasing number of actors as important for the overall capacity of the UN, will in general grant policy gains to member states. Therefore, this self-generating mechanism can drive the process forward by increasing both the *intelligence gains* and the *policy gains* member state expect to receive in supporting the development of intelligence capabilities.

Also related to the policy momentum is the concept known as positive feedback, or self-reinforcement (Pierson 2004:20-30). Once the process of developing UN intelligence capabilities starts unfolding and become recognized, more and more relevant actors are likely to become familiar with and subsequently support the process, causing further acceleration of the policy momentum.

Indicators of policy momentum would be when the process of developing intelligence capabilities (1) gradually gains momentum over time; and (2) is supported by an increasing number of actors, including member states, internal UN departments and agencies, as well as external actors such as NGOs and other international institutions.

3. Research Methodology

This chapter presents the research methodology employed by this study, which is largely built on George and Bennet's 2005 book: *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. With this methodological framework, George and Bennet has provided students of social phenomena with a solid research tool for case studies, particularly appropriate for explaining *complex causality* in line with the philosophy of cross-method collaboration and multi-method work.¹⁶ Thus, the reason why the analytical framework proposed in this study goes well with the case-study approach developed by George and Bennet is, first and foremost, the pattern of complex causality that comes with the *explanandum*: development of dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of multilateral peace operations. Accordingly, George and Bennet's recommend process-tracing as a means of examining complexity in detail and further suggest typological theorizing as a way to model complexity (George and Bennett 2005:13).

3.1 Process-tracing

In process-tracing, the objective is to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes:

The researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case (George and Bennett 2005:6).

As regards middle range typological theories, these can be understood as an alternative to highly general and abstract theories:

¹⁶ George and Bennet (2005:17) define a case as "an instance of a class of events" and the case study approach is described as "the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events" (George and Bennett 2005:5).

Middle-range typological theories, which identify recurring conjunctions of mechanisms and provide hypothesis on the pathways through which they produce results, provide more contingent and specific generalizations for policymakers and allow researchers to contribute to more nuanced theories (George and Bennett 2005:8).

Arguably, the analytical framework of intelligence support to multilateral peace operations proposed in this study, serves as an example of a middle-range typological theory that models a complex phenomenon, and thus produces specific generalizations which may be used for policy guidance. Moreover, the model lends itself to process-tracing in order to examine this complexity in more detail, as is the case with this study.

Put simply, the aim of process-tracing is to illuminate a causal relationship between one or more independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variable. So, how does tracing a process allow one to credibly declare a causal relationship between an independent variable and the outcome on a dependent variable? According to Jeffrey Checkel, it should be possible to establish plausible causal relationships through qualitative interviews and documentary data:

Between the beginning (independent variable) and the end (outcome of dependent variable), the researcher traces a number of theoretically predicted intermediate steps. This step-wise procedure essentially produces a series of mini-checks, constantly pushing the researcher to think hard about the connection (or lack thereof) between theoretically expected patterns and what the data say (Checkel 2005:15).

Accordingly, this study first theorizes key factors for determining the development of intelligence capabilities in support of multilateral peace operations. It then moves on to trace the theoretically expected patterns between these factors and the outcomes of the UN case. Through gathering archival documents, relevant literature, and conducting qualitative interviews with relevant UN officials, scholars, practitioners and member state delegates, the study illuminates causal relationships between the three proposed key factors – member state interests; the institutional framework; and process drivers – and recent increases in the development of UN intelligence capabilities.

3.2 Interview design

The interview design employed in the study is much in line with the one proposed for topical interviewing by Rubin and Rubin (1995:196-225). This design is chosen because it corresponds well with the development of typological theories as suggested by George and Bennet. The reason is that both approaches are highly qualitative in nature and focus on specific topics or types of theories. Topical studies explore what, when, how and why something happened, or did not happen, in this case the development of dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations. Prior to the interview it is important that the researcher prepares well in order to come across as credible, ask relevant questions, and be able to maneuver the conversation in the right direction. Such preparations would include reading documents or academic studies, undertaking more loosely structured preliminary interviews, and watching events unfold (Rubin and Rubin 1995:197). For this study, the preparation consisted of reading relevant academic literature, as well as UN documents and reports on the issue of information analysis in the UN. In addition, getting acquainted with both UN and intelligence jargon proved to be useful once the interviewing had started. Both arenas, the UN and the realm of intelligence, seem to have an affinity towards acronyms, and learning these in advance helped the conversations run more smoothly.

Elite interviews are most appropriate for process tracing. Oisín Tansey (2007) argues that the importance of elite interviewing as a means of collecting the kind of data necessary to carry out process-tracing studies has been neglected to date:

George and Bennet tend to equate the case study method with the historian's method, and in particular archival and document-based research. As a result, while the role of archival work, and its inherent strengths and weaknesses, is discussed in detail, other forms of data collection, including interviewing, are left largely under-explored (Tansey 2007:3-4).

According to Tansey, interviewing, and especially elite interviewing, is highly relevant for process-tracing approaches to case study research. Furthermore, by drawing together insights from the wider literature on interviews and elite interviews, Tansey finds that the use of *non-probability sampling* is particularly useful when utilizing the process-tracing method:

The goal when applying the process-tracing method will not be to use such interviews to make generalizations about the characteristics, beliefs or actions of the full population of relevant actors, but rather to use the testimony of those who were most closely involved to construct a theoretically-informed narrative of the process of interest. (...) In such circumstances, random sampling will be a hindrance rather than a help, as the most important actors of interest may be excluded by chance (Tansey 2007:10-11).

Consequently, Tansey (2007:11-13) suggests specific criteria that might be used to identify potential informants when the goal is to obtain information and uncover causal relationships concerning specific events, actions and processes. First, four different types of non-probability sampling are identified, each with varying rules for selecting the final sample: convenience sampling, quota sampling, purposive sampling and snowball/chain-referral sampling. These four sampling types are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and they are not always easily distinguished from each other.

Tansey suggests two criteria that will have particular relevance for process-tracing studies: In the first approach, the researcher uses positional criteria to identify desirable informants, that is, the analyst specifies a set of positions, or occupations, of key elites that are the focus of the study. In the second approach the researcher does not define the desired set of informants according to the particular positions they hold, but rather according to the extent to which they are deemed influential in a particular political arena by their peers (Tansey 2007:13). This study uses a combination of these two criteria, in line with the so-called snowball sampling approach. This sampling method involves “identifying an initial set of informants, and then requesting that they suggest other potential subjects who share similar characteristics or who have relevance in some way to the object of study” (Tansey 2007:12). In addition, an element of purposive sampling has been used in order to ensure that the sample includes those deemed most appropriate for the research objective.

The UN is not the kind of organization in which one may easily find people’s contact details on a homepage or in a phone book. In addition, finding people who work in units that are still not operational, or in its starting phase, can also be difficult. Therefore, during the first phase of the selection process, my affiliations with both the

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Norwegian Defence Research Institute (FFI) were crucial for getting in touch with relevant people in the UN. Both institutes provided me with valuable help and information, having researchers who were already in contact with UN people.¹⁷ Once in contact with a few people in the UN, the snowball effect was activated, and in a matter of relatively short time I managed to identify several informants of interest for my research needs.

Before getting in touch with people in the UN, the JMAC was the only unit I was aware of that appeared close to fulfilling my definition of a dedicated intelligence capability. However, once I started communicating with various people in the UN, I learned that especially two other intelligence-related units were in the process of being developed in DPKO. The first was the Research and Liaison Unit (R&L Unit), situated in the Situation Centre (SitCen). The second unit was the Assessment Team (A-team),¹⁸ planned to be situated in the Office of Military Affairs in DPKO. Thus, for my sampling I focused on finding people with information on either one of these three entities: the JMAC, the R&L Unit, and the A-Team.

In total, 11 informants participated in semi-structured interviews, covering all three units of interests. In addition, I had “loose conversations” with 4 other relevant people about the issue at hand. Due to reasons of confidentiality, I choose not to go into detail about the identities and positions of the informants.

Two relevant groups are underrepresented in the selection. First, member state representatives have not been interviewed, except representatives from the Norwegian delegation to the UN. Considering that member state interests constitute one of the three proposed key factors, the analysis would have profited from interviewing more member state representatives. The main reason for not including this group is simply that foreign diplomats are not likely to speak openly on behalf of their nation on such a sensitive subject. Thus, the assessments of member state

¹⁷ Cedric de Coning, Research Fellow at NUPI, and Annika Hansen, former Senior Analyst at FFI, and currently Policy Officer at Police Division/Strategic Policy & Development Section in UN DPKO, were particularly helpful in this regard.

¹⁸ A-team is my own not so modest but arguably entertaining acronym of the Assessment Team.

interests towards PKI consists of a cost-benefit calculation between intelligence- and policy gains and autonomy- and vulnerability costs, associated with the development of intelligence capabilities in the UN.

The second group not represented in the selection consists of UN departments and agencies outside DPKO which are also engaged in security related information analysis. Most importantly, the Threat and Risk Unit in the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) perform activities that at first glance may look similar to those intended for the JMAC. However, when looking more closely at the mandates, one realizes that their purpose differs substantially. The primary focus of the DSS is on the immediate protection of mission personnel and assets, while the mandates of the JMAC go far beyond this, involving issues such as economic analysis and environmental assessments. Additionally, several other departments and agencies are involved in security-related information analysis. However, they do not qualify as *dedicated* intelligence capabilities as defined in this study. To include them would therefore have led the analysis to suffer from “conceptual stretching” (cf. Sartori 1970).

The majority of the interviews were conducted in New York City, primarily in UNHQ, in the period February 12-24, 2009. In addition, two interviews were conducted in Oslo and one in Bergen. The interviews were designed as semi-structured, including approximately ten main questions that were asked to all informants.¹⁹ Furthermore, additional questions were asked depending on the position of the informant, new knowledge accumulated during the field work, and the general course of each conversation. The main questions reflected three main topics: (1) what is intelligence; (2) what are the current intelligence capabilities of the UN; and (3) what challenges are distinctive for an organization such as the UN in developing dedicated intelligence capabilities?


¹⁹ The interview guide can be found in the Appendix.

3.3 Data

The sensitivity of the topic of this study, use of intelligence in the UN, makes data collection a somewhat challenging endeavor, not unlike the intelligence gathering process itself. There are few official UN documents dealing specifically with the use of intelligence in support of UN peace operations, people are reluctant to talk about it for fear of being compromised or loosing their jobs, and the little information that exists is often of a very general nature. What is more, disclosed confidential material cannot be used in a publicly available master's thesis.

Philip Davies (2001) argues that one way of dealing with the challenge of studying intelligence and security services is through the use of triangulation and elite interviews. The goal of the triangulation method is to provide a cross-reference between interviews, archival records and secondary sources. Davies argues that because intelligence is something created by and for decision-making elites in national governments (or in this case international organizations), elite interviewing is a central tool in the study of intelligence and security services. Thus, a combination of different sources is the best approach to studying intelligence practices. Davies suggests a triad of (1) primary sources (interviews, published first hand accounts; and (2) documentary sources (published or archival); while having (3) published secondary-source information available in cautious reserve, as depicted in the figure below (Davies 2001:78):

Figure 3: Data triangulation



3.3.1 Validity

One problem of investigating intelligence in the UN is the fact that intelligence is a non-word in the UN universe. Also, as mentioned in the introduction, intelligence is an elusive concept in itself, and even intelligence scholars cannot agree upon one single definition. Thus, knowing that the informants were talking about more or less the same thing was a necessary premise for a valid analysis of the interviews at a later stage. Therefore, in order to control for this uncertainty, every interview started with a discussion about the intelligence concept. Each informant was asked to define intelligence, and to further reflect upon the issue of intelligence in the UN context. As a result, I have for each informant an impression of how they understand the concept, and how they relate it to the UN, which again strengthens the measurement validity of the rest of the interview data.

Measurement validity, also known as concept validity, or construct validity, addresses the issue of whether or not the observations that are made during an investigation meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the concept being investigated (cf. Adcock and Collier 2002). In other words, do the variable measure what it is supposed to measure?

The dependent variable of this study, increased/decreased development of intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations, is here operationalized as any UN entity whose main purpose and function is to generate information relevant to security-related UN mission mandates through the direction, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of information, both overt and covert, about past, present and future events, and the protection of that final product and its sources from other competing actors. These entities are identified from looking into three types of sources: official UN documents and policy directives; elite interviews; and unpublished UN documents.

An ideal source would have been the actual intelligence products of these entities in order to assess how much of an intelligence function they reflect. However, such data is for obvious reasons difficult to obtain, not only because it is confidential, but also

because some of the investigated units are still not fully operational. Still, I did manage to obtain some examples of products from some of the operational units. Nevertheless, this data is not representative for the whole universe and can only be used as supporting evidence and not for making any generalizations. Therefore, I have had to rely on other sources.

First, UN documents and policy directives that *describe* the purpose and rationale of different UN entities were examined in order to identify possible dedicated intelligence capabilities. However, one thing is what a document or policy directive state, another thing is what happens in reality. Therefore, this data is supplemented with interview data, secondary literary sources, as well as other unpublished UN documents in order to achieve greater validity. There are also UN entities whose purpose and rationale are still not stated in any official document or policy directive. In those cases, interview data constitute the primary sources, and the measurement validity is therefore somewhat weakened. However, the interviews arguably constitute fairly good indicators of what the purpose and rationale behind these developing units is going to be, insofar as the informants are closely associated with those units.

Turning to the independent variables, or the three key factors, the first of these – member states interests – is challenging to define and measure, simply because most member states do not publicly formulate their interests towards the policy area of PKI. Therefore, this factor is assessed by considering how rationally behaving states, motivated by a strategic cost-benefit calculation between intelligence- and policy gains and autonomy- and vulnerability costs, are likely to act towards PKI, given their relative position in the international system. This discussion also draws on insights from the informants with intimate knowledge about the behavior of member states towards PKI. Regarding the remaining two key factors – the institutional framework and process drivers – these are measured through a set of proposed indicators, indented to provide a higher degree of precision and quality of measurement.

External validity addresses the issue of whether or not the findings can be generalized beyond the case study. The aim of this study is to construct a model that with a few key factors delineates the prospects for developing intelligence capabilities in support of multilateral peace operations, conducted within the framework of international institutions. Thus, the same model should be applicable to any given international institution engaged in peace operations, e.g. the European Union, the African Union, or NATO.

3.3.2 Reliability

As regards the reliability criterion, a central question is whether or not one would reach the same conclusions and obtain the same findings if the study were to be performed twice or more, at the same point in time, with the same methods. The reliability of the official UN documents is reasonably high. Regarding the interviews, it was important to ensure a setting where the informants would feel comfortable about talking openly on sensitive issues. Therefore, I purposely did not use a tape recorder given the possible negative effect it might have on a person's comfort to talk freely. Instead, I wrote an interview summary immediately after each interview and sent it to the informant in order to confirm that I had captured what they said correctly. In addition, each informant was told before the interview that they could remain anonymous if they wished so. Also, all informants were informed that if any specific part of an interview was to be quoted directly, or published, they would be asked in advance for approval. All interviews were conducted either in the office of the informant, or in a meeting room within the facilities of the informants' place of work. With the exception of one conversation with two Norwegian UN delegates, all interviews were conducted in private settings with only the interviewer and the informant present. Before the interviews the informants were introduced to a short project description, but they were not familiar with the questions they would be asked beforehand. Using semi-structured interviews also strengthens the reliability of the data because it allows for cross-referencing information and facts from the different informants on the same questions. Finally, triangulating first hand sources with

documentary sources and secondary literary sources also strengthens the reliability of the study.

3.3.3 Objections to the case study approach and process-tracing method

One objection to using the case study approach to investigate the issue at hand is that this approach cannot, unlike the quantitative approaches, calculate the exact degree of effect that each independent variable has on the dependent variable. As George and Bennet argue:

Case studies remain much stronger at assessing *whether* and *how* a variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing *how much* it mattered” (George and Bennett 2005:25).

Thus, by using the case study approach, this study does not offer any calculations on the exact distribution of explanatory power across the different key factors on the outcomes in the UN case. However, case studies *can* be used to test theoretical claims about whether or not a variable is a necessary or sufficient condition for a certain outcome (George and Bennett 2005:25-27). Moreover, as the data collection grows, it should be possible to make more specific assertions about which variables have stronger explanatory power than others, on a specific outcome.

A second objection of doing single case studies would be that they lack the representativeness of a larger population. In this case, the larger population would be other institutions engaged in multilateral peace operations. Related to the issue of representativeness, George and Bennet argue that:

Case studies involve a trade-off among the goals of attaining theoretical parsimony, establishing explanatory richness, and keeping the number of cases to be studied manageable. (...) Case study researchers are more interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their outcomes arise (George and Bennett 2005:31).

In this case, the UN was selected because it constitutes a particularly relevant case to study insofar as it is the most active and legitimate peace operator on the global arena. However, doing a comparative analysis with the same analytical framework,

between, the EU, the UN and NATO, come across as a very interesting future project, which could offer further insights to the issue at hand.²⁰

A final potential problem associated with process-tracing is that more than one hypothesized causal relationships may be consistent with an outcome, also known as overdetermination. Thus, deciding whether one factor is causal, and the other spurious, can be difficult. In order to cope with this challenge, the method of structured, focused comparison across cases can be applied (George 1979, George and Bennett 2005). In this case, comparing the UN, the EU, and NATO would serve that end. However, due to constraints on time and capacity, this has not been possible in this study. Still, a context sensitive analysis should be able to discriminate between real and spurious effects, insofar the data material is sufficiently large, diverse and finally cross-referenced.

²⁰ Both the EU and NATO already have developed intelligence capabilities far beyond those of the UN (Yost 2000, NATO 2001, 2002, Aldrich 2004, Müller-Wille 2002, 2003, 2004, 2008, Fägersten 2008). An important reason to why these organizations have come further in terms of developing dedicated intelligence capabilities is that these capabilities are primarily indented to support the national security of member states, not international peace and security as in the UN case. NATO and EU member states also experience more or less the same threat challenges, primarily international terrorism, and can thus more easily find ways to cooperate in the area of intelligence due to shared interests.

4. Developing intelligence capabilities in the UN

This chapter presents variance on the dependent variable, or the development of dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations. This process is presented with a short historical review of the most important PKI events, including a more detailed consideration of the latest developments.

4.1 Early developments

In the UN, intelligence has always been a controversial topic. UN principles of impartiality, transparency, and the protection of human rights, make, and have always made, the organization somewhat sensitive to intelligence. The semi-official *Peacekeeper's Handbook* from 1984 states that:

The UN has resolutely refused to countenance intelligence systems as part of its peacekeeping operations; intelligence having covert connotations is a dirty word. (...) Any form of covert intelligence is liable to create prejudice and suspicion. (...) Trust, confidence and respect form the essential fabric on which a successful peacekeeping operation needs to be based. 'Spying' does not help towards this end (in Johnston 1997:103).

Thus, in the early years of UN peacekeeping, there were many and powerful internal forces working against the development of intelligence capabilities in the UN. However, the need for intelligence support to UN peace operations manifested itself more vividly as the organization got increasingly engaged in hostile and unpredictable conflict environments. As peace operations have developed to become more robust and complex, some of the activities undertaken in these operations have become inherently similar to those of traditional warfare. Hence, in order to uphold effective mission performance there is a need to understand the operational environment, to be able to identify and respond to security threats, and to inform decision-makers about the developments on the ground and their likely consequences.

Yet, most efforts of developing intelligence capabilities within the UN have been either rejected or disbanded. Only recently are there indications of permanent and dedicated intelligence capabilities being developed both at the strategic headquarters

level in DPKO, and at the operational/tactical field level in the missions. This section considers the following 8 cases:

Table 1: List of established or proposed UN intelligence units

Unit	Year	Level of Operation	Target
Military Information Branch (MIB)	1961-64	Field (Operational/ Tactical)	ONUC
Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI)	1987-92	Headquarter (Strategic)	All missions
Information and Research Unit (I&RUnit)	1993-99	Headquarter (Strategic)	All missions
ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) ²¹	Rejected in 2000 and 2001	Headquarter (Strategic)	All missions
Strategic Military Cell (SMC)	2006 – present	Headquarter (Strategic)	UNIFIL
Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC)	UN policy from 2006 – present	Field (Operational/ Tactical)	All missions
Research and Analysis Unit (R&L Unit)	2007 - present	Headquarter (Strategic)	All missions
Military Information Analysis Service (MIAS)	Rejected in 2008	Headquarter (Strategic-Military)	All missions
Assessment Team (A-team)	Under construction	Headquarter (Strategic-Military)	All missions

4.1.1 The MIB

As early as in 1960, a permanent UN intelligence agency was suggested to be established in support of the UN mission in Congo, ONUC. That suggestion, however, was rejected by the civilian leadership of ONUC, arguing that the UN military forces were mandated to perform peacekeeping and training, not spying.

In his revealing case history about his experiences as Special Representative to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld in ONUC, Conor Cruise O'Brien comments on the issue of lacking intelligence support:

²¹ ECPS - Executive Committee on Peace and Security

Individual powers supporting the UN operation [ONUC] did maintain intelligence networks, but the UN itself did not. Hammarskjöld had referred to this once at a meeting of the Congo Advisory Committee, had admitted that it was a serious handicap, and had justified the lack on the grounds that the UN 'must have clean hands,' and therefore could not do the sort of thing that intelligence services habitually do – lying, bribery, blackmail, theft and so on. More pragmatically, an international organization, drawing its agents from many countries, with many points of view, could not ensure anything like the degree of security needed in serious intelligence work, and would be peculiarly liable to infiltration by agents of national services (O'Brien 1962:75-76).

Nonetheless, it was during the ONUC operation that the very first dedicated, though non-permanent, intelligence body was established by the UN in 1961. Due to increasing hostilities and the outbreak of civil war, the creation of a *Military Information Branch* (MIB) was finally accepted by the civilian leadership as a necessary "evil," more than half a year into the mission. Its purpose was to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence to ensure the security of UN personnel, support operational decision-making, warn of possible outbreaks of conflict, and estimate outside interferences, such as arms traffic (Dorn and Bell 1995:15-16). The events that followed represent one of the most comprehensive intelligence support efforts to a UN mission. At its peak, the MIB was conducting wireless message interpretation, aerial intelligence, and human intelligence (HUMINT), involving interrogations of civilians and use of informants (Dorn and Bell 1995). The MIB was established on an ad hoc basis as a result of rapidly changing security threats. Consequently, although its intelligence contributions were significant, they were insufficient (Dorn and Bell 1995:27). The MIB constitutes the only well documented UN intelligence capability from the Cold War period.

Throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium, there have been several attempts of establishing various forms of intelligence capabilities within the UN system. With the end of the Cold War, the UN took on a key role as the only legitimate global custodian of international peace and security (Matlary 2006). Consequently, UN peacekeepers began to take on wider tasks, more often within hostile and unpredictable environments (Bellamy et al. 2004). These wider, or robust, peace operations were frequently deployed to failed states, suffering a break-down of governmental structures and characterized by internal and violent conflicts between multiple groups. Operating in such fluid, volatile and complex environments

introduced new challenges to the UN, and the need for tactical, operational and strategic intelligence support to its field missions became more urgent than before.

4.1.2 The ORCI

At the strategic level, an intelligence-like unit was created as early as 1987, when Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar established the *Office for Research and the Collection of Information* (ORCI). The ORCI was mandated to “assess global trends, prepare profiles of various countries, regions, and conflicts, and give early warning of emerging situations as well as monitoring refugee flows and other emergencies” (Dorn 2006:68). However, the establishment of the ORCI was not appreciated by everyone. Among them, a group of conservative US politicians feared that the ORCI would provide the perfect cover for Soviet spies and make intrusions into the domestic affairs of member states (Dorn 2006:68). The ORCI was established anyway, but it soon ran into problems of underemployment, funding freezes, and bad equipment. Therefore, the ORCI never developed into being a considerable intelligence capability before it was disbanded by the new Secretary General in 1992.

4.1.3 The I&R Unit

When Boutros Boutros-Ghali became Secretary General in 1992, he initiated a reorganization of the whole peacekeeping department of the UN. One of his first decisions was to establish the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The year after, a Situation Centre was created within DPKO, intended to support its decision-making process, and connect civilian, military and police flows of information at the strategic level (United Nations 2009b). Another important task of the Situation Centre is to produce assessments of political, military and security trends that affected ongoing and potential peacekeeping operations. However, in order to successfully execute these tasks, information from the field proved insufficient. Therefore, “DPKO needed a way to tap into the vast information networks of national governments, with their numerous embassies and sophisticated intelligence agencies” (Dorn 2006:71).

Consequently, in 1993, the *Information and Research Unit* (I&R Unit) was created, composed of intelligence officers seconded from the governments of four out of the five permanent members of the Security Council.²² These officers, who worked as so-called 'gratis personnel' in the UN, provided the organization with intelligence feeds from the national intelligence services of their corresponding countries.²³ This event marks a shift in the history of PKI as the I&R Unit represents the first dedicated intelligence capability in support of UN peace operations at headquarters level. It gives evidence of a change in attitude within the UN Secretariat towards the use of intelligence. However, the I&R Unit has received mixed reviews, including accusations of being used as a manipulation tool by powerful member states; of not sharing its products across the Secretariat; and of not operating in a transparent manner (Van Kappen 2003, Dorn 2006). These disapprovals might be reasons why no alternative capability replaced the I&R Unit when it was closed down in 1999. This was the result of a General Assembly resolution prohibiting the work of gratis personnel, pushed through by the NAM countries (Dorn 2006). In all likelihood, it was the same group of states that later would vote against new proposals of establishing intelligence capabilities at headquarters level in the UN. I return to this issue in my discussion of state interests in the next section of this chapter.

4.1.4 The EISAS

When entering the new millennium, member states started turning away from participating in UN peace operations as their confidence in the UN had become severely weakened (Bellamy et al. 2004:144). The post-Cold War record of UN peace operations was stained with failures. Particularly the genocide in Rwanda and the massacre in Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, gave grave testimonies of an organization incapable of upholding its mission mandates. Consequently, the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, established a Panel on United Nations Peace

²² China was unwilling to share information, a prerequisite for membership (Dorn 2006:71).

²³ Working as gratis personnel means being paid by the home government.

Operations tasked to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make *frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change*. The final product of this investigation, published in 2000, is known as the Brahimi Report. This report is widely acknowledged as the most influential on the practice of peace operations, even today. One of its major findings was a serious UN deficiency in dealing with information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning. In other words, the UN did not have the necessary strategic intelligence capabilities. The report states the following:

The Secretary-General and the members of ECPS²⁴ need a professional system in the Secretariat for accumulating knowledge about conflict situations, distributing that knowledge efficiently to a wide user base, generating policy analyses and formulating long term strategies. That system does not exist at present. The Panel proposes that it be created as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, or EISAS (United Nations 2000b:§68).

The EISAS would cover all three main objectives of *strategic intelligence* in peace operations (see pp. 18). According to the Brahimi report (United Nations 2000b:§72-74), the EISAS would (1) provide the Secretary-General and ECPS members with consolidated assessments of the sources and symptoms of ongoing and looming conflicts and the potential utility and implications of United Nations involvement (early warning), (2) provide the basic background information for planning and supporting the set up of peace operations (mission planning), and (3) to continue to provide analyses and manage the information flow between mission and Task Force once the mission has been established (strategic support).

Notwithstanding support from both the Secretary General and the Security Council, the member state committees turned the proposal down (United Nations 2000d:§42, 2000e:part III, 2000a:§13, 2000c:§21). Paradoxically, these negative reactions from the member states may have been unintended consequences from an unfortunate formulation in the report of the Secretariat, where the taboo word *intelligence* was mentioned, although in a dismissive manner.

The information and analysis functions of the Secretariat [EISAS] should not, in any way, be confused with the creation of an “intelligence-gathering capacity” in the Secretariat (United Nations 2000d:§45).

²⁴ Executive Committee on Peace and Security

Notwithstanding unfortunate formulations and member state rejections, the Secretary General was not willing to give up the EISAS. Therefore, the Secretariat was instructed to reassess the proposal in a comprehensive review. The findings of that review reaffirmed UN shortcomings in information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning (United Nations 2001b:§294-300). Consequently, still convinced that the EISAS as originally proposed would help to address these shortcomings, the Secretariat proposed in this report to create a more modest unit. However, the member states remained unconvinced and rejected this alternative proposal as well (United Nations 2001a:§18).

Since the Brahimi report was published in 2000, there has been a renewed belief in UN peace operations. In 2006, a UN evaluation addressed the lack of preliminary intelligence and strategic analysis in UN peace operations. In this document, the General Assembly was recommended to revisit the Brahimi recommendations of establishing the EISAS (United Nations 2006a:3), however, in the end, the EISAS never came to be established. Nevertheless, from 2006 onwards, there has been increasing recognition of the need for intelligence support to UN peace operations, both inside the UN Secretariat and among member states. As a result, several new intelligence-related concepts and bodies have started developing.

4.1.5 The SMC

Interestingly, also in 2006, a situation similar to the one in Congo in the 1960s arose. Once again, the intelligence shortcomings of the UN were exposed through not being able to uphold a mission mandate. An escalation of month-long hostilities in Lebanon, leaving 1200 dead, thousands injured and displacing almost one million civilians, led the Security Council to undertake a series of immediate and substantial new tasks in Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006. That resolution gave the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) a much wider mandate and increased the force strength considerably. This force strengthening involved the establishment of a *Strategic Military Cell* (SMC) intended to provide the required intelligence support. The SMC

is based in UNHQ in the Office of Military Affairs in DPKO and has established its own intelligence unit:

The Strategic Military Cell contributes to the monitoring and assessment of the operational environment in Lebanon and UNIFIL-related military oversight and planning activities within the Secretariat. This includes the development of threat assessments and daily reporting on UNIFIL military activities. Strategic military guidance is provided to UNIFIL by the Strategic Military Cell, which also develops strategic-level contingency planning in close consultation with the field. New military capabilities for UNIFIL on the ground have been generated, such as the Community Outreach Unit, and *the Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Unit*, as well as electronic countermeasures to mitigate the risks posed by improvised explosive devices (United Nations 2008a:§15, emphasis added).

The SMC is today considered a great success and is still operational, despite its ad hoc status (United Nations 2007, 2008a).

4.1.6 The MIAS

In a 2007 comprehensive analysis of the Office of Military Affairs, the Secretariat, still convinced that the DPKO needs to strengthen its strategic intelligence capabilities, and inspired by the successful results of the UNIFIL SMC, suggests establishing a *Military Information Analysis Service* (MIAS) for strategic level military intelligence support to all missions (United Nations 2008c:§25-27). However, like with the EISAS, the member state committees rejected the MIAS proposal (United Nations 2008b:§72-73). As I return to in the upcoming section, these refusals can to a large extent be explained by the vulnerability and sovereignty costs assumed by some countries to come with the development of UN intelligence capabilities. Still, there have been recent changes in attitude also among some of these countries. As a result, a reminiscent of the MIAS is currently under construction under the alias “Assessment Team”.

4.2 Recent developments

Today, there are indications of increasing development of permanent and dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations. At the field (operational/tactical) level, the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) has since 2006 been a required component of all UN Integrated Missions. At headquarters (strategic) level,

the Research and Liaison Unit (R&L Unit) has been operational in the DPKO Situation Centre since late 2007. In the Office of Military Affairs, also in DPKO, another unit is currently under construction, to be called the Assessment Team (A-team).


Before moving on to discussing the relationship between analytical framework proposed in chapter two, and the outcomes of the UN case, an important qualification remains: Do these units qualify as dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations as defined in this study? Dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations is here defined as *any UN entity whose main purpose and function is to generate information relevant to security-related UN mission mandates through the direction, collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of information, both overt and covert, about past, present and future events, and the protection of that final product and its sources from other competing actors.*

Accordingly, dedicated UN intelligence capabilities are identified through triangulation of three types of sources: (1) UN policy directives and reports *describing* the main purpose, functions and specific tasks of a unit, (2) interview informants *describing* the main purpose, functions and specific tasks of a unit, as well as its actual practices, and (3) additional UN documents *describing* the main purpose, functions and specific tasks of a unit.

I argue that these units all contribute positively to increasing development of dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations, although they have yet to reach their full potential. While some of these capabilities are primarily concerned only with military information requirements, others have a more holistic approach to the full spectrum of information requirements of today's peace operations, including analysis of military, political, societal, economic and cultural

issues. Thus, each unit has its own purpose and logic, and they focus on different areas of analysis, at different levels of operation, as depicted in the figure below:²⁵

Figure 4: UN intelligence capabilities



4.2.1 The JMAC

Despite initial start-up problems, the sources indicate that the JMAC is moving towards fulfilling my definition of a dedicated intelligence capability in support of UN peace operations, primarily at the field (operational/tactical) level.

JMAC is today a required element of all UN Integrated Missions (United Nations 2006b:§4). The 2006 Policy Directive describes its main purpose, functions and tasks:

The JMAC provides the Head of Mission (HOM) and Senior Management Team (SMT) with a capacity to collect and synthesise *all-source information* to produce medium and long term integrated analysis. JMAC integrated analysis products should provide the HOM and SMT with improved understanding of issues and trends, their implications and potential developments, as well as assessments of cross-cutting issues and threats that may affect the mission. JMAC analytical products should provide the basis for enhanced mission planning and decision making. (...)

²⁵ CMOS – Current Military Operations Service – is situated within the OMA and does embark on some intelligence-related analysis. However, this is not the main purpose of CMOS, and it is therefore not treated as a dedicated UN intelligence capability in this study.

The JMAC shall be responsible to: Merge and manage mission information requirements from the HOM and SMT; Acquire and integrate information from all mission components and other sources in order to develop analytical products that are timely, accurate, complete and usable; Analyze and synthesize information, including *intelligence*-related material, to prepare integrated analyses and medium and long term evaluations; Prepare and disseminate operational and mission-level assessments to support planning, decision making and implementation of mission mandates (United Nations 2006b:§17-19, emphasis added).

According to the above description, JMAC is arguably close to fulfilling my definition of a dedicated intelligence capability in support of UN peace operations. However, reports from the field, as well as information shared by several people with JMAC working experience, tell another story. Sometimes the JMAC has provided intelligence support as intended, sometimes the JMAC has moved beyond its mandate, and actively collected intelligence using methods that are questionable in a UN context,²⁶ and many times the JMAC has provided nothing more than day to day news reporting with little or no integrated and long term analysis. Mainly three reasons are singled out by the informants in order to explain this deficiency: (1) bad leadership, (2) lack of competence/ wrong personnel, and (3) lack of detailed directives and guidelines.

First, the implementation of the JMAC concept in each mission seems to depend on the personalities and backgrounds of the SRSGs²⁷ and Chief JMACs respectively. In a couple of cases, the SRSG kept JMAC as his own personal information unit and did not share its resources with other senior level managers. Other SRSGs have not fully appreciated the potential value of the JMAC, still others have succeeded in using JMAC both as a decision-making tool and as an integration tool. As one UN official concludes: “It is important that the JMAC not be used as an exclusive information unit only for the SRSG, which is not its intended purpose” (informant J).

Similarly, because the Chief JMAC selects the whole JMAC crew, his personal background influences the arrangement and activities of the JMAC. Sometimes, the

²⁶ As one UN official said “In XX we did use covert methods in operational environment where the security of our personnel was concerned. This question depends on whether or not you actually want to do something” (ref).

²⁷ The Special Representative of the Secretary General has the highest rank in all missions and is always a civilian.

Chief JMAC has an intelligence background and arranges the unit accordingly, and sometimes not. According to one UN official, the Chief JMAC in MONUC is a former academic, the Chief JMAC in MINURCRAT is a journalist, and the Chief JMAC in UNMET is an ex military (informant E). Another UN official commented:

Now, the JMAC depends a lot on who's in charge. It can be very good, and it can be not working at all. One has to ask five questions: How is it used? Who uses it? What does it do? Who works in it? Who runs it?" (informant J).

Thus, the personal backgrounds of individuals involved in the intelligence part of an operation may have important consequences for the development of UN intelligence capabilities.

Secondly, people working in the JMAC often lack the proper skills. One UN official had the following comment about the JMAC:

The problem really is the people we put in them. These are people who are often incompetent and there for the wrong reasons. (...) It is important that the people we train already have the correct background knowledge, which they usually pretty much do not have. (...) The main challenge is that people pretty much have no idea of what they are doing. People who were rejected by their national service decide to go international and work for the UN. Thus, the main challenge is corruption and inaptitude inside the UN. The people we really need are not working here, and the people who work here don't know how to do their job (informant F).

Thus, in many cases, the JMAC crew lacks intelligence experience. Or as another former practitioner puts it: "If you work as a civilian, a master's degree in pretty much any discipline will get you in" (informant A).

Thirdly, and perhaps the main cause of the two previous problems, the current 2006 JMAC Policy Directive is limited in providing detailed directives and guidelines. According to one UN official: T

The initial problem was that the first guidance document was not so very well developed, it came without explanation and support on issues such as how the JMAC should work, who should work there etc (informant K).

The result has been confusion about what the JMAC really is supposed to do. As another UN official says: "The idea of the JMAC is to function as a 'prophet of doom', but instead it gets sucked into operational activities" (informant F). One result of this confusion is that people from the Department of Security and Safety (DSS) in

some cases have been doing assignments the JMAC is supposed to do. According to a former Chief of Staff:

One problem was that DSS went beyond its mandate, and took on analysis tasks that JMAC should have been doing. On the other side, the JMAC daily reports never contained any long-term assessments and only reported about current events from the past 24 hours. The idea was that DSS and JMAC should work closely together, but in reality this never happened” (informant A).

Several initiatives have been made in order to overcome these shortcomings. In order to improve the lack of competence, a JMAC course intended to train future JMAC personnel is under development and is planned to be given in November 2009. This course is outsourced to the Nordic military cooperation forum NORDCAPS, and will be given by the Norwegian Defence International Centre (Nodefic) under the Norwegian Defence and Command Staff College in Oslo. The tentative schedule of this course indicates its intelligence relevancy, with subjects such as: UN Intel architecture; Cultural Awareness/stress management; Culture of intelligence in multinational environment: intelligence in a UN historic perspective; AU, EU and NATO Intel Organizations; The Intelligence Cycle; Collection/Fusion: Intel Requirements, Management, and Collection Coordination; Open Source Managements/Media Relations; Principles of Intel Databases; and Interview Techniques/use of interpreters (NORDCAPS 2008).

In addition, a new JMAC Policy Directive is being developed by the JMAC Advisory Group, intended to provide more detailed directions and guidelines than the previous one.²⁸ A draft of this Policy Directive, including a series of annexes, gives evidence of a more detailed and intelligence-focused directive, with job descriptions for all the different JMAC positions, and samples and models of typical intelligence tools such as: Priority Information Requirements (PIRs); Collection Plans; Profiling; Risk Mapping; Warning Notes; Trend Analysis; Scenario Briefs; Human Source

²⁸ This group consists of representatives from each office of DPKO, as well as DFS and DSS. It comprises 7-10 people and makes policy recommendations, works on the establishment of the JMAC course, and rewrites the JMAC Policy Directive (informant K).

Management; Assessment of Confidential Sources; and Classification Systems (United Nations unpublished).²⁹

Moreover, the R&L Unit is developing a discussion paper on the future of the JMAC, based on experiences from the JMACs in the field. According to one UN official, “this paper suggests future scenarios and recommendations for the JMAC and will constitute an important base for the upcoming policy directive on JMAC, depending on how it is received by the senior management” (informant E).

4.2.2 The Research and Liaison Unit

The R&L Unit contributes to increasing development of dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations, mainly at headquarters (strategic) level. There is not much documentary evidence addressing the main purpose, functions and specific tasks of the R&L Unit. However, interview data gives a fair indication of what its core responsibilities are. One UN official claims that the R&L Unit “is responsible to coordinate the whole intelligence structure of the UN” (informant K). Another UN official, with more intimate knowledge about the unit, states that it performs long term strategic analysis in DPKO and has three core responsibilities: (1) research, based on open sources of information, intended to support strategic decision-making in DPKO, (2) being an information hub for the JMACs that synthesizes daily reporting from all the missions, and produces daily briefing notes that goes out to all the senior managers at the executive level across the UN Secretariat, and (3) liaisoning across the various agencies and departments of the UN, as well as with other international organizations, NGOs, and eventually with national intelligence services if possible (informant E).

Accordingly, the R&L Unit performs activities that are related to intelligence in conducting research and analysis; being the strategic hub for the JMACs; liaisoning with both internal and external actors; and supporting strategic decision-making in

²⁹ These are unpublished drafts classified as UN confidential, and can therefore only give indications future UN policy. Therefore, these documents should not be regarded as evidence or official UN policy as of today.

DPKO. On the other hand, the R&L Unit is limited in capacity with a staff of only four people as of March 2009. In addition, none of these employees have intelligence backgrounds. However, this unit coordinates many of the other intelligence capabilities of the UN. Moreover, given the relatively small staff in comparison to the number of assigned tasks, it is likely that the activities of this unit will be increasing in the future, depending on the motivation of member states and the senior management to increase its capacity.

4.2.3 The Assessment Team

Once operational, the A-team will be contributing to increasing development of dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations, mainly focusing on strategic military intelligence. According to one UN official, the A-team is effectively the same as the proposed MIAS, only under a different name.³⁰ The envisioned principal functions of the MIAS are described in a 2008 UN report:

(a) collate and analyze military information; (b) produce and disseminate strategic military assessments; (c) formulate, review and disseminate the military information required by the Office of Military Affairs; (d) support the management of current military operations, including crisis response; (e) support planning for the military components of potential United Nations peacekeeping missions; and (f) as required, provide the military information analysis staff in a mission start-up capability in the field for the rapid establishment of a new peacekeeping mission (United Nations 2008c:§25)

One UN official says that the idea of the A-team is:

To bridge the gap between daily analyzed information and the geopolitical level of operation. (...) The A-team will be doing operational and strategic-level military analysis not currently done in UNHQ, and will thus provide a unique UN capability (informant I).

Accordingly, the A-team will compensate for capabilities not included in the JMAC/R&L Unit agenda, more specifically strategic analysis of military information. These assessments will primarily be done through data-mining of open sources and gathering of information across missions in the UN, and ideally also from external actors such as research institutions, the media, and NGOs:

³⁰ “Only the name has changed, because the work ‘service’ could not be accepted in the Fifth Committee, particularly among the NAM countries. However, there were no objections to the word ‘Team’” (informant I).

The analysis of the A-team will be mainly based on open sources, as well as UN organizations, field missions, member states and regional actors. Information from the media plays a crucial role. No intelligence service in the world can compete with the access and immediacy of private and well resourced news agency. The products will mainly consist of indicators and warnings of conflicts and threats, Critical Information Requirements (CIRs) – sometimes one may have to help the clients clarify their information requirements –, special issue papers, mission-specific analysis incorporated into broader regional contexts, and wider threat and risk assessments (informant I).

Today, these capabilities do already exist to some extent within the Current Military Operations Service (CMOS) at the Office of Military Affairs. However, according to one UN official, the analysis provided by the A-team will be more dedicated to information analysis only, and directed towards operational and strategic assessments, in contrast to the tactical analysis provided by the CMOS:

Before, we did have analysis capacities spread out in the past three Services of the Office of Military Affairs [CMOS being one of them], but no specialized entities such as the Assessment team. However, there was a need to draft documents, give bios of rebel leaders, assess strategic importance of areas or issues, or stakeholders in Darfur etc. Such tasks require a dedicated capacity with intelligence experience (informant K).

The A-team was in May 2009 preparing to become operational and was already in the process of interviewing potential staff members from various countries.

To summarize, the UN is currently developing several dedicated intelligence capabilities at all levels of operation. While some of these capabilities are primarily concerned only with military information requirements, others have a more holistic approach to the full spectrum of information requirements of today's peace operations, including analysis of military, political, societal, economic and cultural issues. These findings indicate that a critical juncture may have been reached in the area of PKI, given that these units continue to operate as intended to. I return to this issue in the last chapter of the thesis.

5. Applying the model

In this chapter the analytical framework presented in chapter two is applied to the UN case to look for consistency between the three key factors – member state interests; the institutional framework; process drivers – and the empirical findings. All three factors are found to have a significant influence on the recent developments of intelligence capabilities in the UN, outlined in the previous chapter.

5.1 Member state interests

As stated in the theory chapter, indicators of member state interests are challenging to define and measure. Therefore, member state interests are here determined through a cost-benefit calculation between intelligence- and policy gains, and autonomy- and vulnerability costs. This calculation assumes states to be rational actors motivated primarily by their self-interest. It is based on considerations about states' relative position in the international system, as well as insights provided by UN officials, experts, and member states delegates, with intimate knowledge about the behavior of member states towards PKI. In the UN case, the costs of developing dedicated intelligence capabilities seem to outweigh the benefits for a majority of the UN member states, in particular the NAM countries.

5.1.1 The benefits

There are arguably more *policy gains* than *intelligence gains* in establishing a dedicated intelligence capability in support of UN peace operations. The reason is that the intelligence submitted to the UN is not in support of states' national security, but rather in support of the altruistic ideal of international peace and security. Intelligence submitted in support of peace operations in failed states is not very relevant for member states not involved in these operations. In addition, because intelligence submitted to the UN will be accessible to other member states, contributions are likely to be sanitized in order not to reveal one's own capabilities and/or sources to other states. Therefore, the intelligence gains from participating in

the development of UN intelligence capabilities are relatively low for member states not involved in specific peace operations.

On the other hand, for member states directly or indirectly involved in specific peace operations, a dedicated UN intelligence capability would provide intelligence gains in terms of relevant information about the conflict area. Therefore, one would expect states engaged in peace operations to be more positive towards the development of such activities.

Furthermore, states that have an actual interest in international peace and security should also be motivated to develop UN intelligence capabilities. In this context, the distinction between so-called modern, postmodern and premodern state may be useful. Postmodern states constitute a relatively new phenomenon, mainly concentrated in the capitalist core of the world (Buzan and Wæver 2003:22-26). These states are not driven by traditional military security concerns. On the contrary, they have desecuritized much of the traditional agenda of threats. At the same time, they have acquired a new security agenda addressing concerns about identity and migration, the stability of global economic systems, and occasionally also about international peace and security. This categorization of 'state modernity' can be recognized in the findings. When asked which nations are more positive towards sharing intelligence with the UN, countries such as Britain, France, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, the US, and Canada were singled out, in addition to the European Union's own intelligence agencies. Thus, there seems to be a relationship between states' degree of modernity, and their interest towards developing intelligence capabilities within the UN in the name of international peace and security.

Regarding the other category of benefits to member state interests, *policy gains*, there are more obvious reasons why states would be inclined to establish an intelligence capability in support of UN peace operations. There is an extensive Western consensus on the importance of international peace and security. Thus, being recognized by or within the Western international community as someone that

contributes to international peace and security by improving the intelligence capabilities of the UN, might lead states to do just that, even without receiving specific intelligence gains. One example is Norway's contributions to the process of developing the JMAC concept. Norway does not have many peacekeepers deployed in UN missions, nor is Norway likely to receive any intelligence gains from participating in the development of the JMAC. It is more likely that Norway actively supports this process in order to score policy gains, and because it views the JMAC as something positive for the promotion of international peace and security.

Another politically driven reason why member states would consider submitting intelligence to the UN is if that intelligence is in favor of a specific policy or ideology. This mechanism is documented by Dorn (2006) in his study of the role of the I&R Unit during the crisis in Eastern Zaire, 1996-97.

The French government was known to be partial to the francophone Hutus, and maintained long-standing connections with the Hutu leadership. It is possible that this influenced the Unit's reports, which relied heavily on French intelligence. For instance, one report admitted indirectly French complicity with ex-FAR [Force Armée Rwandese] in helping the Hutus to cross into Zaire in 1994 with most of their heavy equipment during the French-led 'Operation Turquoise' (Dorn 2006:81).

This example indicates that member states that are well resourced in the area of intelligence may support the development of a UN intelligence unit in order to front their own politically driven interests by submitting intelligence not necessarily reflecting the interests of the UN.

5.1.2 The costs

The costs of developing dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations are more obvious than the benefits. A more powerful and well-resourced UN, with a functioning intelligence capability, may entail *autonomy costs* for some member states. This is especially true for member states whose regimes are seen as controversial within the democratic and liberal tradition of the UN. These types of regimes are well represented among the NAM countries. Traditionally, these member states are the ones who have voted against the establishment of dedicated intelligence capabilities within the UN system. According to one UN official:

There clearly is a NAM vs. Western states divide in the UN, and it is the NAM countries who control the budget. The NAM countries have traditionally wanted to keep the UN weak, because they see a militarily strong UN as a potential threat to their current power structures, both in their own nation and in the international system. (...) The primary concern of each nation is the sovereignty of their state and the continuation of the government in power. Due to the perception by some states that the UN has been engaging in interventionist operations, there exists a fear that technology-enabled intelligence capabilities may threaten their national security (informant I).

Similarly, another UN official asserts that:

The member states of the UN have often argued against giving the UN an intelligence capacity as it is viewed, particularly by the NAM countries and the host nations, as something that will be used to gather internal information on their countries (informant K).

Consequently, when the proposal of establishing the Military Information Analysis Service (MIAS) was presented in the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) in 2008, some member state representatives would “literally get out of their chair and leave even while questions they had raised were being answered” (informant I). Such reactions give evidence of how sensitive this issue is for some member states.

The perceived *vulnerability costs* of developing intelligence capabilities in the UN are considerable, because the UN does not have any tradition of managing and classifying secret information, and because submitted products will probably be easily available to the large majority of member states. This is recognized by a former Military Advisor to the Secretary General:

Often intelligence is not shared with the UN Secretariat because the nation that owns the information is afraid its intelligence sources may be compromised, or else certain technical capabilities may be revealed. The Secretariat is as watertight as a sieve, it is nearly impossible to keep anything under wraps. An intelligence official from one of the member states once apologised to me with the words: ‘I am sorry. I realise this caveat creates a difficult situation for you personally, but I have no choice. You know how it is in this place. If you even think about something in this building, it is known in 189 capitals the next day’. (Van Kappen 2003:7)

This situation is also confirmed by several informants who recognize the fact that the UN does not have, and will probably never get, a trustworthy database for sensitive information. As one UN official says:

Member states are extremely unlikely to allow that, and if they did, they would require it to be done only for the most senior levels and to be shared with senior member state

representatives. It could be useful, but classification requirements would be high, and as of today the UN does not have such system (informant J).

Similarly, the UN will not be able to operate a fully clandestine service, ensuring safe management of secret information, because it would always be in danger of being compromised by the national intelligence services of member states (informant I).

Finally, a multilaterally-based intelligence unit within the UN framework runs the risk of being manipulated by powerful members. Because only a few of the member states actually have the intelligence resources required in peace operations, they can easily manipulate information which less resourced states would have to treat as reliable. For example, the US has by far the most resourced intelligence system, and the UN does not have the means to validate all incoming intelligence provided by the US. During the times of the I&R Unit, there were fears that the US would manipulate UN decision-making by providing selective and biased information (Dorn 2006). Former Military Advisor to the Secretary General, Major-General Frank Van Kappen, also recognized this mechanism when interacting with the R&L Unit:

On more than one occasion I had the strong suspicion that the information provided by the individuals in this section was intended to steer DPKO into a certain direction or worse, to manipulate DPKO (Van Kappen 2003:6).

Another example of how the US can use its strong intelligence apparatus to manipulate the UN can be found in Colin Powell's memorable presentation of intelligence-based "evidence" of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in the Security Council before deciding to invade Iraq.

Summing up, the costs of establishing dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations seem to outweigh the benefits. This is primarily because states would normally prioritize their own national interests before the interest of international peace and security. This makes the prospects for developing dedicated intelligence capability within the UN look quite gloomy. The question is, then, are there any features of the UN institutional framework that could facilitate such development?

5.2 The institutional framework

Estimating the effects from the institutional framework on the prospects for developing UN intelligence capabilities can be done with a cost-benefit calculation between institutional barriers and catalysts. The UN framework introduces several barriers to the development of UN intelligence capabilities which to a large extent explains previous failed efforts, as well as why existing arrangements have yet to reach their full potential. On the other hand, the empirical findings give evidence of a recent increase in the development of dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations. This increase can to some extent be explained by the work of political entrepreneurs within the institutional framework of the UN, working as catalysts to the development of UN intelligence capabilities.

5.2.1 The barriers

The first barrier, *institutional resilience*, is indicated (1) when development is obstructed by an actor with veto rights, or (2) when development/application of intelligence capabilities in the operational theatre is held back due to legal obstacles imposed by the host nation. The findings document that institutional resilience is a significant barrier to the development and application of dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations.

As described in the previous chapter, the member state committees vetoed all post-Brahimi proposals of establishing dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations, until the establishment of the A-team was finally accepted (United Nations 2000c:§21, 2000a:§13, 2001a:§18, 2008b:§72-73). The General Assembly acted in accordance with the policy recommendations from the member state committees, which led them to defer several proposals from the UN Secretariat addressing the need to develop intelligence capabilities in UNHQ. It is normal UN practice that the General Assembly follows recommendations from the member state committees. Therefore, committees such as the ACABQ, the Fifth Committee, and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, constitute ‘veto players’. This

contributes to make institutional resilience significant as a barrier for the development of UN intelligence capabilities.

As regards the second indicator of institutional resilience, the findings show that legal obstacles imposed by the host nation of an operation constitute a recurring problem. Most UN missions are organized more or less in cooperation with the regimes in power, who usually give their consent to UN presence. However, as sovereign states, there are limitations to the types of activities they will allow the UN to undertake. As one UN official explains:

The UN is often dependent of the consent of the host nation in order to gather information. This was never permitted in XX. (...) Here, the national intelligence was very good at SIGINT [signals intelligence], and had full control about everything that happened. For example, one time they held back a UN container of communication equipment in order to examine what it could be used for, before allowing its entrance to the country. They also claimed that the equipment could contain Israeli chips as an excuse to keep holding it back (informant A).

Aerial surveillance and signals intelligence have proved to be two of the most helpful intelligence activities in peace operations (Dorn 2007). At the same time, these are activities that the host nation often denies the UN to undertake. According to one UN official:

A problem is the unwillingness of host nations to allow whatever capabilities the UN may have to be used. For example, in XX there was a need for cell-phone intercept to interdict armed group leaders; however, the state was not willing to allow such activities. Also, in Africa there is a problem of being allowed to use UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] (informant I).

What is more, the host nation will in many cases have its own intelligence service with which the UN, in an ideal world, could cooperate. However, the consent of the host nation is often more symbolic than real. A former JMAC analyst explains:

In XX I was part of a protection cluster and the question of whether or not we should share information with NGOs represented in this cluster came up. While we did allow NGOs to participate as they often had excellent information, the challenge was whether or how much to share with national staff representatives, for obvious reasons. Sharing sensitive information with them involves high risks and thus limiting its dissemination is important (informant J).

The reason is that there is often contact between rebel leaders and local nationals, and intelligence shared with national representatives may therefore be compromised.

Summing up, due to multiple veto players, and legal obstacles imposed by the host nation of the operations, institutional resilience constitutes a significant barrier to the development and deployment of UN intelligence capabilities.

The second barrier, *institutional bureaucratic resistance*, is indicated when development of intelligence capabilities functions poorly due to (1) lack of internal information sharing, or (2) problems of internal coordination and cooperation across departments and agencies. The findings document that institutional bureaucratic resistance constitutes a significant barrier to effective development of UN intelligence capabilities.

The UN bureaucracy contains great amounts of information relevant to effective mission performance. Therefore, an important task of any UN intelligence unit is to synthesize information that already exists within the UN system. However, internal sharing of information is a problem, both at headquarters level, and in the field. According to one UN official:

There is a great problem of internal sharing within the UN. Although there is a lot of information inside the organization, the various units and departments often do not share information because they are in competition with or feel intruded by other fellow units/departments (informant E).

As regards information sharing in the field, several UN officials describe it as a major problem in the UN:

Information only goes up, but seldom down, and it needs to go in all directions. Instead, it is stovepiped, and people don't share information thereby limiting the ability for decision-makers to understand the full picture (informant J).

In JMAC the information is very tightly controlled. The information is only shared with senior mission management which means that you need really good coordination if the information is going to support other mission components (informant J).

Complex peacekeeping has a tendency to undertake stovepipe reporting while there is a need for an integrated reporting structure. Important information can often be lost due to lack of integration across units and departments (informant E).

In fact, some informants claimed that external NGOs are often more willing to share information than internal UN departments and agencies:

The NGOs are more willing to share information. The civilians in the UN often have their own agenda that they follow in order to position themselves in relation to other units and departments. This leads to a situation where people hold back important information so that they can use it to promote their own interests whenever it suits them (informant A).

Thus, the size and complexity of the UN system, as well as internal competition and positioning, contribute to make institutional bureaucratic resistance a significant barrier to effective intelligence exploitation and cooperation inside the UN.

The final barrier to developing dedicated intelligence capabilities in the UN system, *organizational culture*, is indicated (1) when development/application of intelligence capabilities is being held back due to ethical dilemmas rooted in the dominant organizational culture of an international institution, or (2) if the level of integrated development is low due to prevalence of either civilian or military organizational cultures within an institution or institutional body. The findings indicate that organizational culture also constitutes a significant barrier to the development of effective intelligence capabilities in the UN.

With regard to the first indicator, the covert nature of intelligence conflicts with the dominant culture of the UN, which is characterized by principles of transparency, impartiality, and protection of human rights. This leads to a number of ethical dilemmas concerning the development and application of intelligence capabilities. When confronted with this issue there was a considerable amount of inconsistency in the answers from the various informants. There were substantial disagreements about what methods the UN may use in order to ensure effective mission performance. Regarding the use of covert methods, some of the UN officials gave the following comments:

I mean, in principle all these methods should be used when necessary, but any attempt by the UN to undertake covert action would be dangerous for the credibility of the mission and would likely become perverted in one way or the other. Therefore, it would be better if some national capacity offered to do the collection part and then share it with the UN, which sometimes happens, but not often enough (informant J).

It all depends on the mandate. Take for example the prevention of genocide. I would be more than willing to defend myself in a court on the charges of using covert intelligence methods in order to prevent genocide. The ends justify the means (informant F).

There is one logical and one political response to that question. The logical one is that one must use whatever means necessary in order to avoid genocide. The political answer would

depend on judgment of the situation. Probably, as R2P [responsibility to protect] becomes more implicated, using the necessary means will become more legitimate (informant D).

The aim allows the means, in many cases, pending on the situation. But only within existing rules and regulations. You have to do everything possible with the available means. Of course you cannot torture people in order to have them talking, however, I see nothing wrong with for example providing them with a favorable setting, for example a five star hotel and a massage, if that is going to get them talking. I mean, I am not advocating anything like what happened in Guantanamo, with water drowning techniques etc., you must stay within the rules. How close you will get to the edge of the rules, though, often becomes a dilemma. There should be some sort of proportionality. In XX we say that if you wake up the next morning and can look at yourself in the mirror without feeling bad, then it's probably OK (informant K).

Drawing a line between what is justifiable, and what is not, is indeed difficult. There is a legal grey zone of which methods may be permitted, and it will always depend on the situation. In general, most informants agreed on aerial surveillance as a justifiable method, while listening in on communication networks was viewed by most as more questionable. Several of the informants referred to episodes where the UN has used intelligence gathering methods that in principle went beyond the mandates, but that were seen to be necessary in order to “get things done”. Some also asserted that effective use of intelligence could strengthen UN legitimacy, insofar as it contributes to more effective mission performance. A general tendency was that the informants with military backgrounds were more positive towards the use of covert methods than the civilians. This gives evidence of a second challenge related to the issue of organizational culture: the cultural clash between civilian and military UN staff.

With regard to the second indicator of organizational culture, there is always some friction when military elements are incorporated into the system of a predominantly civilian organization such as the UN. One reason is that in UN operations the military staff is being rotated every 6 or 12 months, which, according to one UN official, “causes them to be less involved in the operations than some of the civilians, as well as not having the time to really integrate” (informant E). Similarly, another civilian UN official explains:

The military can be very difficult to work with because of the rotation and because of the attitude that goes with some of them. The mindset of cooperation must be ensured from the most senior of levels otherwise the various components, military, police, and civilian, will continue to work in stovepipes. Also, the military do not easily share information with us and

thus the civilians will also hold back – again, better cooperation would enhance a common perspective and common approach to dealing with challenges in the field (informant J).

However, it is not only the civilians who get frustrated. As one UN civilian admits: “The military probably feel frustrated if their capabilities are not well understood by the ones they are supposed to integrate with” (informant E). Sure enough, informants with military backgrounds expressed some frustration. For example, one of them complained about the power of the civilian Director of Administration, a position that is occupied by the Department of Field Support (DFS).

There is also the Director of Administration who controls the logistics of every mission, including key aspects of military logistics with direct influence on intelligence capabilities such as the availability of mission aircraft for aerial observation. These people do not always appreciate the importance of the military elements of an operation. (...) Thus, the DFS has a lot of power as it manages all assets. Also, the Director of Administration is usually a civilian with many years of UN experience, while the Force Commander is a military with less UN experience. Therefore, the Force Commander is sometimes at a disadvantage-because he doesn't know the system as well as the Director of Administration (informant I).

In the same way, a former chief of a UN military staff told that:

In HQ in XX we even had a ‘uniform free’ building. When I tried to place a military liaison there, it turned out to be impossible as the civilians refused to have him there (informant A).

Other examples include JMAC crews that have been either made up of all civilians, or all military personnel. These examples indicate that cultural clashes between civilian and military elements of the UN constitute a barrier to the development and implementation of effective intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations.

Summing up, operating within the framework of the UN introduces several barriers to the development of dedicated intelligence capabilities within the organization. However, the institutional framework of the UN also contains catalysts that will have the opposite effect and drive development forward.

5.2.2 The catalysts

The first catalyst, *coordination facilitation*, is indicated (1) when member states share intelligence with international institutions because they conceive of them as useful tools for promoting their own interests; (2) when oversight of intelligence activities is

delegated by member states to institutional secretariats or bodies; or (3) when member states articulate their interest of developing intelligence capabilities within the framework of a given institution. The findings do not show much evidence of coordination facilitation as a significant catalyst to the development of UN intelligence capabilities.

Regarding the first indicator, several informants reported on intelligence contributions from member states, but only in a limited fashion. As UN official told:

The French and the Americans are probably the ones most interested in sharing, but the little information that we receive is often not very different from what we already have. It has been sanitized in order not to compromise the interests of the contributor (informant E).

In general, only a few member states have the required resources to make substantial contributions, and among those few member states, contributions are scarce and often depend on whether or not that state has troops deployed a UN mission.

Regarding the other two indicators, there is little evidence that UN member states have been actively pushing the development of intelligence capabilities forward within the UN framework. A few nations, for example Norway, have articulated an interest in further developing the JMAC concept. The Norwegian Ambassador to the UN in 2008, Moa Juul, articulated the following statement in a session in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations:

Situational awareness is key to the protection of civilians and to the safety and security of our own personnel. Well-functioning Joint Mission Analysis Centres are vital in that respect. Norway leads the Nordic initiative to develop JMAC training in close cooperation with, and with support from, the Secretariat. A UN JMAC pilot course will be held early next year in Oslo (Juul 2008).

Similarly, the Norwegian Ambassador to the UN in 2009, Morten Wetland, gave the following statement in the same committee the year after.

My fourth point is that analytical capacities at headquarters should be strengthened. This is vital in order to enhance the Secretariat's capacity to provide the best advice possible to the Security Council prior to the adoption of mission mandates. Circumstances on the ground are becoming increasingly complex. Mandates must be formulated and resourced to take that into account. Even more importantly, mandates must be reviewed regularly to maintain the best possible match between needs and resources (Wetland 2009).

Nevertheless, there are few other documented member state efforts towards either actively delegating responsibility to the UN Secretariat in the area of PKI, or of simply articulating their interests towards developing UN intelligence capabilities. Therefore, coordination facilitation seems not to have been a significant catalyst for the development of UN intelligence capabilities.

The second catalyst, *institutional entrepreneurship*, is indicated when the development of intelligence capabilities to a large extent builds on proposals, reports, and policy suggestions made by state neutral secretariats or bodies within the framework of the relevant institution.

The findings document institutional entrepreneurship as a significant catalyst to the development of UN intelligence capabilities. As described in the previous section, the process of establishing dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations builds on propositions, suggestions, and solutions written by the UN Secretariat, the most important one being the Brahimi Report. Below are some more recent examples:

OIOS [Office of Internal Oversight Services] noted the general perception that the term “intelligence” has negative connotations and that “military information” is used as a euphemism. An intelligence officer therefore becomes a military information officer, intelligence summaries become military information summaries and so forth. In essence, these are merely cosmetic changes that do not alter the vital importance of the intelligence process in which information from diverse sources, available in many languages and media (oral, written and imagery), is deliberately and consistently collected, processed, analysed and presented to decision-makers in order to reduce uncertainty and suggest alternatives in making an unstable situation more manageable. OIOS believes that there is more to gain from explicitly acknowledging the vital importance of “intelligence” for successful peacekeeping than from continuing to maintain this term’s negative connotation (United Nations 2005:§6).

The Security Council should make efforts to issue SMART mandates, and for this purpose preliminary intelligence and strategic analysis are a must. In this regard, there is considerable room for improvement, as the current lack of a realistic, accurate, comprehensive and up-to-date initial pre conflict assessment of situations does not facilitate the formulation of SMART mandates. Pre-conflict intelligence is still too weak (United Nations 2006a:§25).

Specialist military officers are required to carry out more complex operations; this includes the collation and analysis of military intelligence, the planning, management and oversight of military maritime, air and aviation capabilities, and the provision of advice to the Department of Field Support on the planning, support, management and oversight of military operations, particularly in regard to military logistics and communications. All of these capacities are currently lacking in the Office of Military Affairs (United Nations 2008c:§16).

Overall, various UN departments, special commissions, agencies, and units have contributed substantially to writing reports and documents addressing the need for intelligence support to UN peace operations. Moreover, the reports are formulated in ways that mitigate some of the challenges posed by member states, e.g. by demystifying the word intelligence. By doing this, institutional entrepreneurs make proposals more attractive to the member states, and drives the policy process forward. Thus, the findings indicate that institutional entrepreneurship has contributed significantly to the development of intelligence capabilities in the UN case.

The final catalyst, *individual entrepreneurship*, is indicated when the development of intelligence capabilities within an international organization can be traced back to specific individuals involved in the policy process. The findings indicate that individual entrepreneurs have contributed considerably to the development and applications of UN intelligence capabilities.

As discussed in the previous section, the SRSG and the Chief JMAC both seem to have had great influence on the implementation of the JMAC concept. One UN official credited the SRSG and Chief JMAC in one mission for the relative success of its corresponding JMAC:

This success has a lot to do with the person who served as the first Chief JMAC in MONUC. In addition the SRSG appreciated the value of the JMAC, which is also an important element. Other JMACs have suffered under-appreciation from other mission elements such as Political Affairs of DSS, who feels that JMAC is taking over their assignments. It's really all about the people who are deployed (informant E).

Several informants expressed frustration over the relative autonomy of the SRSGs, and how their personal approach to the question of intelligence support has a strong, and sometimes negative, effect on the outcome. Addressing this issue, one UN official stated that “some SRSGs think of themselves as subordinate only to the Secretary General, and therefore behave like field marshals out in the field” (informant I). Thus, individual actors can have both positive and negative effects on the development and implication of UN intelligence capabilities.

In addition, a few names are often referred to as key players in the process of developing intelligence capabilities in the UN. For example, Major-General Patrick

Cammaert is by several recognized as one who pushed this process forward in the UN. He has served as Military Advisor to the Secretary General, and as commander in several missions, including UNMEE, SHIRBRIG, UNTAC and UNPROFOR. There is also the different Secretary Generals who have initiated UN reforms leading to the creation of intelligence-related units such as the ORCI and the I&R Unit. Moreover, the Secretary Generals have on the whole supported all proposals and reports advocating the need to establish intelligence capabilities in DPKO.

Thus, individual entrepreneurs seem to have played a crucial role for the development and application of dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations.

5.3 Process drivers

Process drivers can drive the development of intelligence capabilities forward by changing the circumstances within which the two previous factors are determined. Both process drivers – threat balancing and policy momentum – are found to have been at play lately, thereby causing a change of attitude towards PKI both within the UN Secretariat and among member states.

5.3.1 Threat balancing

Threat balancing is indicated (1) when the development of new intelligence capabilities is preceded by a change in the perceived security threats, and (2) when the character of the developing capabilities corresponds to the specific security challenges that are faced. The findings show that threat balancing constitutes an important factor for explaining the recent change in attitude towards the issue of PKI.

Both indicators of threat balancing correspond to the change in attitude that can be found internally among UN employees, but in particular among the NAM countries that were against the development of UN intelligence capabilities in the first place. During recent years, the NAM countries have substantially increased their contributions of personnel to UN peace operations. As a result, NAM constitutes

today the large majority of UN peacekeepers in the field (Center on International Cooperation 2009). Through lessons learned, many of these countries are now starting to understand and appreciate the importance of intelligence support to peace operations. They have come to realize that the security challenges they face in the operational environment require sophisticated intelligence support at all levels of operation. Accordingly, they have adjusted their policies towards the development of intelligence capabilities within the UN system. According to one UN official:

The NAM resistance was very strong a few years ago. However NAM countries are starting to accept the fact that the UN needs the intelligence capacity, especially those who are deployed in the field. As a result, there are only a very small number of countries that still oppose this capacity (informant G).

This is probably one of the reasons why the development of the A-team was finally accepted by the member state committees.

Threat balancing also takes place within large institutional secretariats and bodies. The above section documented how the MIB in Congo (1961-64), and the SMC in Lebanon (2006-present), both came to be established due to sudden changes in the security challenges the UN troops were facing. The threat balancing mechanism is expressed in several reports issued by the UN Secretariat. The following example is only one out of many:

There have been an increased number of crises in the peacekeeping environment, particularly in the past two years. (...) Given that crisis situations endanger the lives of United Nations personnel and the civilian populations that they are mandated to protect, additional security measures are required by the military to ensure both its own protection and the security of those whom it is its duty to protect. The delivery of time-sensitive information on activities that pose a direct threat to United Nations personnel and the civilian population is therefore essential. Consequently, increased capacity is required for *military intelligence*, specifically the collation of military information and its analysis in order to make accurate assessments, produce sound contingency plans and protect United Nations forces and civilians under imminent threat, and for crisis response. (United Nations 2008c:para.7, emphasis added)

Thus, as peace operations turn more robust and complex, the perceived threat scenarios change and lead to threat balancing, both among member states and within institutional secretariats and bodies.

5.3.2 Policy momentum

The second process driver, *policy momentum*, is indicated when (1) the process of developing intelligence capabilities gradually gains momentum over time, and (2) is supported by an increasing number of actors, including member states, internal departments and agencies, as well as external actors such as NGOs and other international institutions. This mechanism is generated by the policy process itself. Both indicators of policy momentum are recognized in the findings.

With regard to the first indicator, the process of developing intelligence capabilities within the UN system has gradually gained momentum throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium. The initial steps were taken both by institutional and individual entrepreneurs, as early as in the 1960s. However, it was in particular during the 1990s and around the turn of the millennium that the process really started to gain momentum. Today, the process has reached a stage where it has become almost fashionable to talk about the need for intelligence support to UN peace operations.

Considering the second indicator, recent developments give evidence of an increasing number of actors interested in the development of UN intelligence capabilities. One interesting finding from the interviews was that representatives from both the EU and NATO have recently approached high ranking UN officials in order to make “deals” and share intelligence. As one UN official explains:

NATO tried to sell in their project to us in order to receive our information, but that is not in our interest because the information they offer is nothing more but what we already have. The EU too wanted a one-way traffic solution. We share a little more information with the EU than with NATO, but still, the information they are willing to share with us is very scarce (informant E).

Ten years back, the word intelligence could not even be mentioned in a UN context, and would never figure in any UN document. This has now changed. This study documents several UN reports talking openly about the need for intelligence support to UN peace operations, and actually using the term intelligence instead of other euphemisms such as ‘military information’. The need for intelligence is now starting to be appreciated not only by UN staff, but also among member states, research institutions, and, as the above example indicates, similar institutions. In May 2009,

the author witnessed the former Under Secretary General of DPKO, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, together with UN expert Bruce Jones from the New York based Center on International Cooperation (CIC), both highlighting intelligence as a key factor to the success of future peacekeeping operations. They also confirmed that intelligence is starting to be incorporated into UN structures more now than ever before. Thus, a policy momentum seem to contribute to a change in the general discourse on PKI, and thereby also to the actual development of UN intelligence capabilities.

6. Conclusion - implications for theory and practice

The objective of this study has been twofold: First, to develop an analytical framework that with a few key factors delineates the prospects for developing dedicated intelligence capabilities in support of multilateral peace operations, conducted within the framework of international institutions. Secondly, to apply this analytical framework to the UN case in order to offer a qualified judgment on whether or not the UN has reached a critical juncture in the area of PKI.

Based on a combination of insights offered by rationalist and historical approaches to new institutionalism, three key factors were proposed as determining for the development of intelligence capabilities within the framework international institutions: (1) the configuration of *member state interests* towards the idea of establishing dedicated intelligence capabilities within a given international institution; (2) the distinctive *institutional framework* of that international institution; and (3) *process drivers* which are internal and external uncontrollable forces that may cause a change in the circumstances within which the previous two factors are determined.

When discussing these three factors in relation to the UN case, they all proved to be useful for explaining relevant events and outcomes. The cost-benefit calculation of member state interests indicated that the autonomy and vulnerability costs of developing UN intelligence capabilities outweigh the intelligence and policy gains for the large majority of member states. Moreover, the analysis demonstrated how the institutional framework of the UN introduces both barriers to and catalysts for the development of intelligence capabilities. Institutional resilience, institutional bureaucratic resistance, and organizational culture were all found to constitute significant barriers to the process of developing intelligence capabilities within the UN framework. Together with the member state interest calculation, these institutional features explain previously failed attempts, as well as the limitations of current capabilities. On the other hand, both institutional and individual entrepreneurs represented significant catalysts, facilitating the process of developing UN

intelligence capabilities. In addition, the two process drivers – threat balancing and policy momentum – were found to have caused a change in the circumstances within which the two first key factors have played out recently, thereby causing an overall change in attitude towards PKI.

This overall change in attitude leads us to the second inquiry of the study: Has the UN reached a critical juncture in the area of PKI? Even though it is too early to make definite conclusions, the empirical evidence indicates that a critical juncture has indeed been reached in the area of PKI, involving a major shift of UN policy. Recapturing Weingast's (2007) historical-rationalist model, a central question was whether or not the prevailing idea in a society would be replaced by a new and competing idea, pushed forward by political entrepreneurs to the extent that a pivotal actor starts supporting this new idea. In this context, new information or changing circumstances have the power to alter the relative attractiveness of various choices and may therefore change actors' preferred actions or strategies in a given policy area (Weingast 2007:162). Once the probability that this new idea is true (π) has risen sufficiently, so that the critical threshold (π^*) has been surpassed, ($\pi > \pi^*$), the circumstances for a significant change in policy are present. In that case, a critical juncture is to be expected.

The empirical evidence indicate that the critical threshold for developing intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations has been surpassed, and the pivotal actor has started to act on the new idea. In the UN case, the pivotal actor is a combination of the UN Secretariat and the NAM countries, given their prevalence in the member state committees. The prevailing idea was that the development of UN intelligence capabilities challenged the open nature of the UN, as well as the autonomy and vulnerability of UN member states. The new idea involved recognizing the need for intelligence support to UN peace operations, as well as understanding that UN intelligence does not necessarily constitute a threat to states' autonomy and vulnerability because it is predominantly based on open sources, or otherwise sanitized. As documented by the empirical findings, new information about the need for intelligence support, as well as the poor record of UN peacekeeping, provided the

necessary evidence that the UN capacity to manage and sustain peace operations was too weak, and strengthening the intelligence capabilities was necessary. Moreover, as new member states engaged in peace operations, they learned to appreciate the need for intelligence support. As a result, UN reports, UN staff, and member state delegates are now starting to highlight the value of intelligence support to UN peace operations. In addition, more information about the nature of PKI is now available, which demystifies the idea and makes it more attractive to the member states that were reluctant initially.

As a result of these changes, several intelligence-related concepts and bodies are currently being developed within the UN system. In this regard, the study documents the envisioned functions of three specific UN entities whose main purpose is to provide intelligence support to UN peace operations: the JMAC, the R&L Unit, and the A-team. Having examined these three units more in detail, they are all found to contribute positively to the development of UN intelligence capabilities, although they have yet to reach their full potential. The recent developments of these units indicate a significant shift in UN policy towards PKI.

Finally, a draft of the proposals, recommendations, and conclusions from the 2009 session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations indicates that the NAM countries are starting to act on the new idea:

The Special Committee welcomes progress made to date in the development of the Joint Operations Centres (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) in DPKO-led Field Missions. To further this strand of work, the Special Committee recommends that the Chief of the Peacekeeping Situation Centre, who chairs the newly established DPKO-DFS JOC-JMAC Support Group, oversee further development of these concepts and brief the Special Committee on a bi-annual basis on its outputs. The Special Committee looks forward to the completion of the draft JMAC guidelines before its regular Session in 2010 (United Nations 2009a:§47, unpublished).

NAM controls the recommendations proposed by this committee, which is the central distributor of policies and guidelines to UN peace operations. Therefore, this excerpt constitutes a strong indicator of a general policy shift among the NAM countries.

A determining characteristic of a critical juncture is that the policy shift is permanent. Therefore, only time can tell whether or not the development of the JMAC, the I&R

Unit, and the A-team represent a critical juncture in the path towards dedicated and permanent intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations. However, an overall consideration of the empirical findings presented here suggests that a critical juncture has indeed been reached in the area of PKI.

6.1 Theoretical implications

The theoretical landscape of new institutionalism has proved useful for analyzing the development of intelligence capabilities within international institutions engaged in multilateral peace operations. The combination of rationalist and historical institutionalism provides a fruitful theoretical foundation for explaining the development of a complex phenomenon over time, and for modeling such complexity with the recourse of a few key factors. The concept of critical junctures from historical institutionalism can be used to enrich rationalist analysis with more context sensitive assessments involving temporal processes. Likewise, the ability of rationalist institutionalism to aggregate findings into systematic theories about the general processes involved in institutional development can be used to assist historical institutionalism in constructing formal models of critical junctures.

The PKI literature has to date no common analytical platform from which scholars can be assisted when developing explanations and theories of the PKI phenomenon. The analytical framework proposed in this study provides a way of formalizing the concept of critical junctures in the context of PKI. It can be used to determine the prospects for developing PKI capabilities within any given international institution engaged in multilateral peace operations. It lends itself to process-tracing through historical examination of key events, and to systematic assessments of member state interests and the institutional frameworks these interests are framed within.

The idea of developing this analytical framework is not to insist on a template of how to study PKI. Rather, the intention is to give one example of how general theories of social science can be used to assist PKI scholars in studying the phenomenon in a more systematic and precise fashion. Moreover, once a systematically developed

analytical framework is proposed, it becomes subject to scrutiny, refinements, and further theory development by other scholars, based on their own unique insights, ideas, and empirical evidence. Only through such practice can PKI research prosper, and develop better theories of the phenomenon. In this context, PKI scholars would not only profit from taking advantage of the analytical framework proposed in this study, but also from developing additional PKI theories by lending from more established theoretical approaches to individual and social behavior, intelligence, international institutions, and international relations. Only when there are multiple and competing theories and explanations of the same phenomenon is there room for a fruitful scholarly debate. In this context, weak theories and explanations are eliminated, and the overall quality of the field of study becomes strengthened. This type of scholarly debate has so far been missing in the field of PKI, and it is therefore time that PKI scholars pick up their research tools and start developing more and better theories.

6.2 Policy implications

From a practitioner's perspective, those in charge of developing future intelligence capabilities in the UN will profit from being aware of previously failed attempts to establish similar bodies, as well as the obstacles generated by the combination of member state interests and the institutional framework of the UN. This study demonstrates that developing intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations is challenging, but possible. It also documents a change in attitude towards the use of intelligence, both within the UN Secretariat, and among member states that used to be more reluctant. Thus, now is a good time to take advantage of the PKI momentum that is building up.

One central task for those involved in developing UN intelligence capabilities will be to further demystify the intelligence concept and to highlight the distinctive features of PKI that makes it less of a threat against states' autonomy and vulnerability than traditional state-based intelligence. To this end, Open Source Intelligence is a particularly relevant intelligence discipline that can be further developed within the

UN system (Steele 2004, 2006). Moreover, liaisoning with external actors such as NGOs, research institutions, and possibly national intelligence services, will contribute not just to better intelligence products, to but also to more public awareness concerning the importance of intelligence support to UN peace operations.

Concerning the prospects for further development of current and future intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations, it will be important to document their added value to the overall UN capacity of managing and sustaining peace operations. Here, the comprehensive reviews of the UNIFIL SMC (United Nations 2007, 2008a) can set a good example of both how to clearly outline the relevance of intelligence support to effective mission performance, and how to review and summarize the most important activities and added value of a given unit.

If the JMAC, the R&L Unit, and eventually also the A-team, all live up to their intended purpose, functions, and mandated tasks, and document their activities and relevance to the member states, the poor record of intelligence support to UN peace operations can be improved. The continued existence and practice of these units will serve as a definitive confirmation that a critical juncture has been reached.

Yet, there are limitations to the development of intelligence capabilities in support of UN peace operations. The majority of member states receive few benefits from developing these capabilities, and the costs are significant. Moreover, there are several barriers within the UN framework obstructing the process. Therefore, UN intelligence capabilities are likely to be limited in comparison to other institutions with fewer member states and different institutional frameworks. In this context, one may conclude that UN intelligence capabilities will be limited indefinitely, given the large number of member states and the distinctive institutional framework of the organization. This should be in the minds of those Security Council members prescribing new mandates for the UN, involving engagements in hostile and unpredictable environments.

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Appendix

Interview guide

1. Current occupation

- 1.1. Title/rank
- 1.2. What is your current job/occupation?

2. Personal background

- 2.1. What is your educational background?
- 2.2. What is your professional background?
- 2.3. Did you have any intelligence relevant education or working experience before this job?
- 2.4. Have you had any intelligence relevant training/ courses within the UN?

3. Intelligence – definition, conceptualization and requirements

- 3.1. How would you define/describe intelligence?
- 3.2. What are the intelligence requirements for effective performance in today's peace operations?
- 3.3. Should the UN have intelligence – what kind?
- 3.4. Does the UN need secret intelligence/covert action?

4. JMAC

- 4.1. What do you know about the JMAC?
- 4.2. Would you consider the JMAC as an intelligence unit?
- 4.3. What kind of intelligence-gathering methods does the JMAC use?
- 4.4. Does the JMAC fulfill the intelligence requirements? If not, what is missing?
- 4.5. Who manages JMAC in DPKO?

5. Current situation

- 5.1. How would you describe the current intelligence capabilities of the UN?
- 5.2. What departments/offices/units have intelligence capabilities/resources (SitCen/OMA/OO/)?
- 5.3. Do you think the current capabilities fulfill the requirements?
- 5.4. What is missing? What can be or should be done?

6. Past situation

- 6.1. What do you know about past efforts of developing intelligence capabilities within UN structures? MIB/ I&R Unit/ EISAS/ MIAS/ SMC
- 6.2. Why do you think the EISAS and MIAS failed to be established?

7. Intelligence sharing- national interest – international cooperation

- 7.1. Does intelligence-sharing constitute a challenge/problem for effective mission performance?
Why?
- 7.2. Which states share and which states don't?
- 7.3. Why do you think states choose not to share?
- 7.4. Would sharing of intelligence with the UN undermine states' national interest?
- 7.5. How would you describe the quality of the incoming intelligence?
 - 7.5.1. Politically biased?
 - 7.5.2. Relevant?
 - 7.5.3. Can it be shared internally/externally?
 - 7.5.4. Who manages it?
 - 7.5.5. How is confidentiality preserved?

8. Legitimacy

- 8.1. Does use of intelligence undermine UN legitimacy as global peace operator? Why/why not?
- 8.2. Can use of intelligence strengthen UN legitimacy?
- 8.3. Are there some types of intelligence activities that could be justified, and others not? Which and why?

9. Civil-Military Cooperation

- 9.1. Does civil-military cooperation constitute a challenge/problem for effective performance?
- 9.2. Is there a civilian aversion against use of intelligence in the UN?
- 9.3. How would you describe average UN civilian understanding of intelligence in general and the intelligence requirements of peace operations in particular?
- 9.4. Is there a military aversion against civilians in the UN?
- 9.5. Can these problems be overcome? How?
- 9.6. To what extent does UN intelligence units need civilian expertise?
- 9.7. To what extent are civilians included/ trained today?

10. Other

- 10.1. Any other major challenges to fulfilling the intelligence requirements?
- 10.2. Are you familiar with external research on Peacekeeping Intelligence?
- 10.3. How would you evaluate the chances of the UN ever fulfilling the intelligence requirements for effective performance in modern operations?
- 10.4. What should happen in the future?
- 10.5. NATO/EU?
- 10.6. Any other aspects/perspectives/comments you would like to add?